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Abstract 
 This project is a case study of the types and effectiveness of voter mobilization 
efforts in the U.S. presidential elections of 1828 and 2008. Political parties, candidate 
campaigns and interest groups utilize a variety of different voter mobilization tactics with 
the goal of persuading potential voters to make the leap to become voters. By utilizing 
newspapers and academic works, I determined the tactics that political organizations 
deployed to mobilize potential voters in both election years. Innovative mobilization 
tactics evolved in the presidential elections of 1828 and 2008, including the development 
of a two-party system and the use of the internet to distribute mobilizing messages which 
is why I have chosen to study them together. Additionally, the winning candidates of 
1828 and 2008 were more representative of the American population. I utilized election 
result data, ANES and exit polls to determine the effectiveness of voter mobilization 
efforts at increasing voter turnout rates. Voter turnout rates were compared to turnout 
rates in neighboring election years to provide context for the dramatic changes that 
occurred in 1828 and 2008. The evidence suggests that voter mobilization efforts were 
effective at persuading potential voters to participate.    
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 One of the most critical criteria of a successful democratic system of governance 
is the ability for citizens to participate in politics. Political participation can take a variety 
of different forms including running for office, contacting a member of Congress, and, 
most basically and fundamentally, voting. Through elections, eligible citizens are able to 
select an individual to represent their values, beliefs and interests in the legislature. This 
basic responsibility creates the essential makeup of elective bodies and gives citizens 
voice in their government. Both of these aspects are central to the development and 
maintenance of a just and democratic society. It is also an application of civic duty for 
those individuals who choose to participate.1 At its root, voting in the United States is 
about choice. A potential voter must follow a line of decisions including which issues are 
most important, which party to support, which candidate is preferred and, most 
importantly, whether or not to participate at all. Many Americans do not make the choice 
to participate in electoral politics and abstain from voting at all.  
Voter turnout is critical to electoral politics since those individuals who choose to 
exercise their right to vote determine the outcome of a given election. Political entities 
such as political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups engage in a variety of 
different tactics to motivate and mobilize citizens to participate in the electoral process. 
Through contact, they hope to influence the decision making process of potential voters. 
The goal of mobilization is to convince potential voters to make the transition to voters. 
Significant amounts of capital are contributed to these measures and the valuable time of 
both staff and dedicated volunteers is expended. Mobilization tactics include person-to-
                                                
1 Verba, Sidney., Scholzman, Kay L., & Brady, Henry E. Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in 
American politics. Harvard University Press: 1995.  
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person interaction between a voter and a campaign supporter as well as specialized 
messaging to specific voters through various forms of media such as email or pamphlets. 
In some election years, innovative mobilization tactics are developed and these new 
strategies are effective at mobilizing the electorate. Evidence suggests that new voter 
mobilization efforts used in the presidential elections of 1828 and 2008 were effective at 
mobilizing voters.   
Throughout the history of the United States, the methods of political contact with 
the electorate have evolved.2 However, similarities do exist in mobilization methods of 
the past and in more recent days. For this reason, I am studying the presidential elections 
of 1828 and 2008. In the elections of 1828 and 2008, new and innovative mobilization 
techniques were employed by and in favor of the ultimate winner, which is why I believe 
they should be studied together. The essential questions of my project are: what types of 
mobilization tactics exist? Which types of mobilization tactics are most effective at 
energizing the electorate? A variety of different tactics were utilized by the various 
entities related to the elections in both 1828 and 2008. I have elected to study these 
particular election years together because innovative mobilization strategies were 
effectively implemented by political organizations in these years. Because 1828 and 2008 
are separated by 180 years, it is possible to study the evolution of voter mobilization 
efforts over the course of American history when these two election years are considered 
together.    
Because voter turnout is central to determining the outcome of elections, it is 
important to understand the implications of voter mobilization. Campaigns and interest 
                                                
2 Schier, S. (2000). By invitation only: the rise of exclusive politics in the United States. Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
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groups frequently engage in a variety of actions in order to mobilize the public in favor of 
their particular cause. Some of the most basic forms of mobilization tactics include door-
to-door canvassing by supporters in which a certain message is verbally distributed to 
potential voters; telephone banks in which supporters pass messages or conduct surveys 
of the public through telephone calls; direct mail and leaflets in which messages are 
conveyed to voters through the written word; and advertisements through various forms 
of media such as television and radio in which a central message is communicated. 
Political organizations spend millions of dollars in the United States on the 
implementation of these various techniques. Countless hours are spent by the staff and 
volunteers of political parties, campaigns and interest groups in the interest of achieving 
these goals in each election cycle.  
For this reason, it is important to study the implications of voter mobilization 
upon voter turnout levels. Voter mobilization is a central focus of political organizations 
in elections. These actions expend a significant amount of valuable resources. Whether or 
not resources are wasted upon these costly undertakings has inherent value. Any popular 
norm that inherently uses resources that cannot be recovered such as time and money 
should be evaluated in order to determine its value. By studying two elections that are 
separated by a significant number of years, I intend to investigate the value of 
mobilization tactics throughout American history in addition to evaluating the changes 
time has wrought upon those tactics and mobilizational skills. The elections of 1828 and 
2008 were further related by the implementation of new and innovative mobilization 
tactics that changed the course of electoral politics.   
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The elections of 1828 and 2008 were unique for a variety of different reasons. 
The winning candidates of both elections brought a greater degree of representation of 
the American population to the most prestigious elected office in the nation. In 1828, the 
first westerner was elected to the presidency.3 Andrew Jackson, a populist, did not 
support the political power held by the American socio-economic elite that was 
epitomized by his competitor, incumbent John Quincy Adams. He was, to many 
Americans, a president of the common man. To his supporters, Jackson represented the 
interests of the people at large instead of the interests of the wealthy and educated. In 
2008, the first African American president was elected to the coveted Oval Office. As a 
member of a minority group, Barack Obama represented the essential diversity of the 
American population. The son of a single mother, Obama also had the capacity to 
understand the inherent struggle of the middle class. Both Jackson and Obama 
represented the people in important and different ways than any of their predecessors. 
They brought the diversity of the American public to the forefront of American politics. 
Each election managed to alter the makeup of the executive branch in critical ways. 
Different demographic groups were given greater voice and recognition through the 
ascendancy of the winning candidates of Andrew Jackson and Barack Obama. Both 
elections were also contentious and fought with innovative tactics. 
In the election of 1828, Jacksonians such as Martin Van Buren established long-
standing foundations of American electoral politics. Political parties developed around 
the supporters of Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams.4 The two-party political 
                                                
3 Remini, Robert V. The Election of Andrew Jackson. Harper and Row, Publishers Inc. New York, New 
York. 1963.  
4 Cole, Donald B. Vindicating Andrew Jackson: the 1828 election and the rise of the two party system. 
Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2009.  
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system was firmly established in the United States following this election. The two-party 
system is integral to electoral politics in the United States. Van Buren knitted together 
loyal supporters across the nation with a national organization that acted through local 
groups.5 These actions brought supporters together in unique and innovative ways, which 
helped to increase voter turnout.  
In the election of 2008, Barack Obama and his team further developed the 
successful ideas of his predecessor George Bush in the 2004 election.6 The internet was a 
major component of the Obama campaign; through online pathways, Obama was able to 
raise extraordinary amounts of capital and organize numerous volunteers to electioneer 
on his behalf.7 Obama was able to heighten his involvement and prominence amongst 
potential voters through social media platforms such as Facebook and his innovative 
website as well as through popular websites such as YouTube where campaign messages 
dispersed rapidly.8 John McCain utilized some similar techniques with less sophistication 
and success. These mobilization tactics transformed electoral politics in the United 
States.          
A structural organization will follow. In the following chapter, I will conduct a 
literature review. Due to the essential importance and relevance of voter turnout and 
mobilization to electoral politics in the present, a variety of scholars have investigated 
various aspects of these concepts. In order to determine the unique angle of this study, it 
                                                
5 Parsons, Lynn H. The birth of modern politics: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and the election of 
1828. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
6 Bishop, Bill. The big sort. Houghton Mifflin: 2008.  
7 Magleby, David M. “Elections as sports teams: spending by campaigns, political parties, and interest 
groups in the 2008 election cycle.” From The change election: money, mobilization and and persuasion in 
the 2008 federal elections. Temple University Press: 2011. Retrieved from: 
http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/j.ctt14bt6t0.7?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents  Accessed 
on 10/14/2016 
8 Smith, Aaron. “The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008.” Pew Research Center. (2009). Retrieved from: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/ Accessed on 10/13/2016. 
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is critical to understand what scholarship already exists on the subject matter of voter 
turnout and mobilization. I will discuss the major discoveries and research methods 
undertaken in this expansive and growing field of study. 
In chapter three, I will begin data analysis and discussion of the election of 1828. 
Far less information exists on this election because it took place in the distant past. 
Extensive records of the election of 1828 do not exist as they do today. For this reason, 
far fewer data exist and are accessible today. The types of mobilization efforts will be 
uncovered by revelations in newspaper articles published in the different stages of the 
election cycle. It is possible to determine what tactics were employed by the developing 
political parties and campaigns through their reportage in the partisan presses. By 
studying written records, it is possible to identify what tactics were used by political 
parties, interest groups and campaigns in this election cycle. I will utilize election results 
data and compare it to population data in order to determine voter turnout levels. 
Furthermore, I will compare the 1828 data with data concerning neighboring presidential 
elections. In this way, I intend to highlight some of the statistically important changes in 
voter turnout that occurred in the presidential election of 1828.  
In chapter four, I will analyze similar data concerning the election of 2008. A far 
greater level of information is available about this election cycle and for this reason, this 
particular chapter will be richer than its predecessor. The types of mobilization efforts 
employed by political parties, campaigns and interest groups will be identified and 
discussed. I will use newspapers and scholarly literature to determine the types of 
mobilization efforts that were used. A plethora of information concerning this election 
exists particularly on the internet. The innovative strengths of the Barack Obama 
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campaign will be discussed including their use of the internet as an integral component of 
their campaign strategy in comparison to the online presence of the competing campaign 
of Senator McCain. Electoral returns, population data and polling conducted by such 
sources as the American National Election Studies will be utilized to analyze the 
presidential election data of 2008. These data will also be compared to similar data 
concerning other presidential elections including the election of 2004. I will utilize the 
same data sources that I used in chapter three and will supplement the sparse data of 1828 
with the richer data sources of 2008.  
In chapter five, I will synthesize the information gathered in the previous two 
chapters to formulate my conclusions. I conclude that the evidence suggest mobilization 
tactics are effective at motivating the people to vote. Both the campaigns of Andrew 
Jackson and Barack Obama were able to effectively utilize mobilization tactics to 
influence voters and persuade citizens to support them at the ballot box. Social pressure 
was the center of their mobilization strategies. Martin Van Buren effectively created a 
national political party with intense local roots to solidify the presence of Jackson 
supporters in neighborhoods and communities where supportive messages were more 
easily distributed. These social factors of both direct and indirect mobilization impacted 
the outcome of the election. The Obama team used the internet to connect supporters 
through social media such as Facebook and the campaign website. Volunteers and staff 
undertook traditional mobilization tactics such as door-to-door canvassing and telephone 
banks in order to spread the message to a wide variety of likely and potential voters 
throughout all fifty states.  
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The elections of 1828 and 2008 effectively used mobilization techniques to 
motivate certain segments of the electorate. This particular project is unique due to the 
nature of its comparison. Scholarship on mobilization and voter turnout on the election of 
Andrew Jackson is limited. No one has attempted to identify the types and effectiveness 
of mobilization tactics in the election of 1828. A plethora of scholarship exists on the 
2008 presidential election. However, the elections of 1828 and 2008 have not been 
studied together for the purpose of analyzing mobilization strategies. For this reason, my 
research is unique and will shed light upon the value of mobilization in relation to voter 
turnout in presidential election cycles.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 A wide range of research exists on the study of both voter mobilization and voter 
turnout in American elections. Many scholars are particularly interested in examining 
voting patterns, which demographic groups are more or less likely to participate in the 
political process, why so few Americans vote, what motivates people to vote, and how 
the electorate can best be motivated to participate, among other questions.  Because those 
who turnout to vote determine the ultimate outcome of an election, both scholars and 
political operatives are interested in understanding what influences citizens to participate. 
Some believe that campaigns, parties and organizations persuade different parts of the 
electorate to become voters through the application of mobilizing contact. Many scholars 
conduct experiments to collect data and examine the impacts of different mobilization 
techniques on their samples. Others abstractly consider the electoral environment. In 
order to demonstrate the unique angle of my research, I will briefly summarize existing 
research in the field of voter turnout and mobilization.  
 There has been a significant change in the way that campaigns, political parties 
and interest groups interact with the American electorate over the past two hundred years. 
In the earlier days of the Union, mobilization was conducted by appealing to the 
electorate as a whole in order to produce enthusiasm and participation through popular 
politics.9 By appealing to the diverse electorate as a whole, candidates and campaigns 
believed that their message would inculcate the population and thus grant them victory. 
Turnout rates began their impressive rise in the nineteenth century with the election of 
                                                
9 McGerr, Michael E. The decline of popular politics: the American north 1865-1928. Oxford University 
Press, New York: 1986.  
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Andrew Jackson in 1828. Popular politics in the nineteenth century was characterized by 
excitement, pageantry and clientelism.  
Political parties were incredibly localized. Parties thought of votes and voters as 
means to control government offices and, through government offices, government jobs. 
As Piven and Cloward said, political machines would persuade potential voters to vote by 
“inducing them with friendships, favors, small bribes, by the promise of some protection 
from the harassment of city cops, or by threatening them with the loss of any of these.”10 
This has transformed immensely in recent years. Today “candidates, interests, and 
consultants carefully identify those in the public most likely to become active on their 
behalf and then employ a variety of inducements to stimulate the action” of voting.11 
Schier designates mobilization as the past action of appealing to the electorate as a whole 
and activation as the new tactic of targeting specific messages to individual potential 
voters in order to increase their likelihood of participation. He argues that these changes 
have had negative impacts on democracy in America by popularizing a method of 
exclusion in which a significant portion of the American population is ignored and, 
therefore, not properly represented. For this reason, Schier argues that the brand of 
inclusive politics exhibited by the mobilization practices of the past were far better for the 
American public at large.  
 Mobilization is also generally considered as the actions taken by campaigns, 
political parties and interest groups to persuade eligible members of the electorate to 
participate in politics. Political entities such as political parties target individual voters in 
                                                
10 Piven, Frances F., & Cloward, Richard A. Why Americans don’t vote. Pantheon Books, New York: 1988, 
39.  
11 Schier, Steven E. By invitation only: the rise of exclusive politics in the United States. University of 
Pittsburgh Press: 2000. 
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order to distribute specific messages to increase the likelihood of participation. Politics, 
including the electoral variety, has a variety of costs. The goal of the campaign, political 
party and interest group is to persuade potential voters to overcome the cumbersome cost 
of participation. The paradox of voting states that people “receive only collective benefits 
[from voting and so] they will not turnout to vote, and for very good reason: The result of 
the election will be the same whether they participate or not.”12 Citizens must be 
convinced to overcome the various costs of voting such as having to “register, learn 
something about the candidates and parties, decide how to vote, and get to the polls on 
election day.”13  
Campaigns, political parties and interest groups attempt to convince potential 
voters to favor their argument. Rosenstone and Hansen argue that political groups tend to 
target people they are already familiar with; those in prominent positions in social 
networks who have the best capacity to spread the message throughout their social circles 
and mobilize others indirectly; those who are powerful and have more influence over a 
variety of other people; and, finally, those who are likely to participate already such as 
partisans. Due to the availability of resources such as time, money and civic skills, 
wealthier and more educated individuals are more likely to participate in politics. These 
certain varieties of citizens are more likely to be targeted and are, therefore, more valued 
in the political process. These characteristics are widely accepted among the scholarly 
community. As Schier argued, Rosenstone and Hansen agree that the specific targeting of 
recent mobilization efforts excludes a significant proportion of the eligible electorate.   
                                                
12 Rosenstone, Steven J., & Hansen, John M. Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America. 
Macmillan Publishing Company: 1993. 
13 Wolfinger, Raymond E., & Rosenstone, Steven J. Who votes? Yale University Press: 1980.  
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Verba, Scholzman and Brady created the Civic Voluntarism Model by evaluating 
data collected from a massive two-step, randomized phone interview of eligible voters in 
order to examine how different aspects of socioeconomic status (SES) impact the 
likelihood of political participation.14 They argued that the political process does not 
equally represent all of America’s citizens because everyone does not participate equally. 
In many cases, those individuals who are equipped with greater civic skills and resources 
are more likely to participate in politics and those who participate more frequently are 
better represented. Wealthy and well-educated citizens, they determined, are better 
equipped with the necessary resources for participation such as organizational and 
writing skills as well as the time and money to focus on politics. Additionally, if an 
individual does participate beyond simply voting, they are likely more informed and 
passionate about certain issues than is the rest of the population. Many of these 
individuals belong to issue publics.  
Some believe that voter mobilization efforts are effective if certain conditions and 
attributes are present amongst the eligible electorate. For example, citizens who are 
connected to a political organization are more likely to turnout to vote. Whether or not a 
citizen is a registered member of a political party is likely to impact their likelihood of 
voting. In many instances, “districts with a higher proportion of declared partisans have 
higher rates of turnout.” 15 Conway also argues that voter turnout is likely to be higher 
when more prestigious political offices such as president are on the ballot. Voters, 
Conway said, are sometimes persuaded to vote through different cognitive mobilization 
practices.  
                                                
14 Verba, Sidney., Schlozman, Kay L., Brady, Henry E. Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American 
politics. Harvard University Press: 1995.  
15 Conway, Margaret M. Political Participation in the US. CQ Press: 2000,  
13 
 
In some instances, Conway argues that voter turnout is likely to increase “when 
there is little consensus on the issue agenda and the preferred outcomes regarding the 
issues, and when one party’s candidates are not assured of victory.”16 She additionally 
believed that mass media is incredibly influential in persuading voters to participate and 
who to vote for. Candidates and campaigns communicate with the electorate through 
advertisements and debates, which are presented through mass media with “frequent 
repetition of a single theme being simply and vividly presented so that it becomes 
familiar and is easily remembered by these potential voters.”17 A variety of outside 
factors influence the way that potential voters become voters.  
Some argue that political participation is driven not only driven by genuine 
interest in politics. At certain points in time, people act because “they care about 
addressing problems in their own lives or living up to a personal sense of who they 
are.”18 By investigating the participation rates of New Orleans Hurricane Katrina 
refugees in the 2006 mayoral race with a multi-tiered approach, Han showcases the 
impact of issues in motivating people to vote. Potential voters only become voters if they 
are motivated to participate in the electoral process. Some individuals, Han said, belong 
to different issue publics which “refer to different groups of voters who have particular 
concern for certain policy issues.”19 One example of an issue public is the environment 
public in which voters are particularly interested in policy questions related to the 
environment.  
                                                
16 Conway, Political participation, pp. 87.  
17 Conway, Political participation, pp. 93.  
18 Han, Hahrie. Moved to Action: motivation, participation and inequality in American politics. Stanford 
University Press: 2009. 
19 Han, Moved to action, pp. 11.  
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If people are passionate members of an issue public, they are more likely to 
participate in the political process if their issue is being targeted in pending legislation or 
in the public eye. Han ties motivation to psychological theories including the idea that 
people are more likely to participate if they have an emotional reaction to an issue at 
hand. People, Han says, “who have made the connection between a political issue and 
their personal concerns” are more likely to participate in the political process.20 
Individuals tend to remember things that they care about more often and vividly and if 
they care about something they are more likely to act. Caring, Han says, can increase 
voter turnout.  
Some political scientists believe that campaigns can utilize these kinds of strong 
opinions to influence the way that voters decide who they will vote for. Because the 
United States political system is, at heart, a two-party system, many members of the 
electorate will not agree with every policy decision and stance of their party. Campaigns 
can focus on controversial and topical issues that are likely to divide each party; some 
people who do not support their party’s stance on an important issue are likely to decamp 
to the other side. In this way, campaigns can obtain the support of persuadable voters. 
Campaigns “can affect the electorate by priming the criteria on which voters base their 
decisions either by increasing the accessibility or importance of particular criteria or 
simply informing the public when candidates line up with different criteria.”21 Hillygus 
and Shields suggest that utilizing wedge issues to divide the electorate effectively 
influences persuadable voters by conducting two surveys of voters. They surveyed 
whether or not participants agreed with their party or disagreed on a number of issues and 
                                                
20 Han, Moved to action, pp. 43. 
21 Hillygus, D. Sunshine, & Shields, Todd G. The persuadable voter: wedge issues in presidential 
campaigns. Princeton University Press: 2008. 
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from these studies concluded that some 25 percent of the electorate are persuadable 
voters with “issue positions that are inconsistent with their preferred party.”22 Wedge 
issues, they concluded, were influential in helping persuadable voters decide who to vote 
for. 
Some political scientists believe that voter turnout itself is not terribly important. 
What matters the most to campaigns is whether or not the voters who do turnout vote in 
their favor. For this reason, campaigns have tended to focus their efforts upon 
successfully motivating their party’s particular base to participate in the election cycle. It 
is logical, Cavangh argues, that “the preferences of habitual nonvoters who are newly 
mobilized at a given point in time must be distinctively different from those of the 
habitual voters for even a sizeable turnout increment to affect the distribution of the total 
vote.”23 The voices of the many habitual voters are more powerful than the handful of 
habitual nonvoters who are motivated to participate unless a significant number turnout. 
For this reason, Cavangh believes that elections are won when a campaign is best able to 
convert habitual voters who prefer the opposite party.  
Partisan habitual voters are central to elections. Political parties, campaigns and 
interest groups often rely upon mobilization tactics in order to contact partisans and 
encourage them to participate in the electoral process. A plethora of literature exists that 
examines mobilization. Donald P. Green has conducted an impressive amount of studies 
upon the value of different mobilization tactics.24 In their book, Green and Gerber 
                                                
22 Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable voter, 59.  
23 Cavangh, Thomas E. “When turnout matters: mobilization and conversion as determinants of election 
outcomes.” From Political participation in American democracy. Edited by Crotty, William. Greenwood 
Press: 1991. 
24 Green, Donald P., & Gerber, Alan S. “Get Out the Vote!. Brookings Institution Press: 2004, Retrieved 
from: 
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collected data from a variety of nonpartisan groups who utilized different mobilization 
techniques such as phone banking, door-to-door canvassing and leafletting. They studied 
the local election results in comparison to the potential voters contacted and were able to 
calculate whether or not contacted voters participated.  
Gerber and Green found that personal contact by campaign volunteers and 
workers is the most effective tactic to increase voter turnout. Canvassing, they said, “by 
friends and neighbors is the gold-standard mobilization tactic; chatty, unhurried phone 
calls seem to work well too.”25 These personal interactions tend to be more influential on 
potential voters. Less personal forms of campaign communication such as formal 
leafletting and automated phone calls are less effective. Personal contact by someone that 
a potential voter knows has a more influential impact because they “seem to encourage 
people to talk about the upcoming election with others in the household, which has the 
effect of extending the influence of a canvassing campaign beyond those who are 
contacted directly.”26 By discussing the election, people are able to increase the societal 
norm of participating in the electoral process. These individuals are able to indirectly 
mobilize others that they are familiar with.   
Green, Gerber and Larimer also investigated the importance of mobilization 
through social pressure.27 Different types of mailers were distributed to potential voters, 
including some that stressed the civic duty aspect of voting and some showed the 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1gpcdbr.4?Search=yes&resultItemClick=tr
ue&searchText=voter&searchText=mobilization&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3
Dvoter%2Bmobilization%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp
%3Bgroup%3Dnone&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Accessed on 11/4/2016 
25 Gerber & Green, Get out the vote!, 6.  
26 Gerber & Green, Get out the vote!, 38. 
27 Gerber, A.S., Green, D.P., & Larimer, C.W. “Social pressure and voter turnout: evidence from a large-
scale field experiment.” From American Political Science Review volume 2, no. 1. American Political 
Science Association: 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/27644496 
Accessed on 11/11/2016 
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potential voter’s own record as well as those of their neighbors. While many of the 
mailings were effective at increasing voter turnout rates, the most effective mailer 
showed voting records and “implies a remarkable 8.1 percentage-point treatment 
effect.”28 By showing the voting records of the individual in comparison to their more 
active neighbors, this particular tactic effectively applies social pressure to persuade the 
potential voter to participate in the electoral cycle. When it is the social norm to vote, 
more people are likely to participate. The pressure to conform to social norms convinces 
potential voters to participate. Green and Gerber also suggest that potential voters can be 
persuaded to participate through simple stimulation such as a single mailer.29 
Christopher B. Mann conducted a similar field experiment to that of Green et al. 
in order to study the impact of social pressure on voter mobilization. Mann worked with a 
nonpartisan organization and distributed a single mailer to targeted voters which 
encouraged them to vote.30 Mann theorized that more aggressive social pressure would 
elicit a negative response in voters in the long run. In short, citizens may develop a 
negative association with the act of voting, which would reduce their likelihood of 
participation. The social psychology theory of reactance, Mann said, states that 
“individuals with a negative response to a message may ignore it, perform the opposite of 
the behavior advocated, or attack the source of the message.”31 Mann’s experiment 
showed that both forms of mobilization contact are effective at motivating potential 
voters to participate.  
                                                
28 Gerber, Green & Larimer, “Social pressure”, 38. 
29 Gerber, A.S., & Green, Donald P. “The effect of a nonpartisan get-out-the-vote drive: an experimental 
study of leafletting.” From The Journal of Politics volume 62, no. 3. University of Chicago Press: 2000. 
Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/2647962 Accessed on 11/11/16 
30 Mann, Christopher B. “Is there backlash to social pressure? A large-scale field experiment on voter 
mobilization.” From Political Behavior Volume 32, no. 3. Springer Science + Business Media, LLC: 2010. 
Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/stable/40960944 Accessed on 11/11/2016 
31 Mann, “Social pressure”, 388.  
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The psychological impact of gratitude has also been examined in electoral 
politics. As discussed above, social pressure has proven to be a statistically effective 
mode at mobilizing potential voters. It appears that behaviors by campaigns that inspire 
an emotional response in the recipients leads to an increase in voter turnout. This also 
appears true when positive actions are employed. Costas Panagopoulos conducted three 
field experiments to test the effect of gratitude on the mobilization of the electorate.32 
Each experiment surveyed registered voters who received non-partisan mailings; official 
records were utilized to determine whether or not targeted potential voters participated. 
Mailings thanked voters for participating in the previous election cycle. Panagopoulos 
found that “gratitude treatment elevated turnout by 3.0 percentage points on average.”33 
Panagopoulos concluded that the gratitude treatment had a statistically significant impact 
upon voter turnout levels.     
A critical component of voter turnout and mobilization has received less attention: 
voter registration. In the United States, a potential voter must register within their state of 
residence to be eligible to vote. Each state does not have the same voter registration laws 
and requirements; some states require potential voters to register weeks in advance while 
other states like Maine permit same-day registration. These stipulations have significant 
impacts upon voter turnout. Most campaigns, Robert A. Jackson noted, fail to focus on 
registration during the window of registration in many states.34 Because campaigns focus 
upon energizing potential voters to vote and not encouraging eligible citizens to register, 
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turnout can be depressed. For this reason, Jackson said, “the increase in intensity of 
campaigns that takes place during the last few weeks before an election comes too late to 
encourage the registration of most Americans.”35 Many people can be impacted by the 
buzz and excitement during the final surge of the election but are unable to express their 
opinions in the ballot box because they have missed their opportunity to register. By 
creating three separate models that explored influential characteristics such as education 
and income and their impacts upon registration status, Jackson’s data suggest that 
campaigns are best able to target and mobilize voters who are already registered to vote.  
Some political scientists have also studied the impact of new technological 
advances upon the electorate and voter mobilization strategy. One critical technological 
asset is email. Email is an easy and inexpensive form of communication. In the present 
day, many campaigns utilize email to stay in contact with potential voters about news and 
advertisements and to show support for their goal by contributing monetarily or by voting 
in the upcoming election. David W. Nickerson conducted a field experiment to survey the 
effectiveness of email in mobilizing the electorate.36 Nickerson sampled volunteers from 
the nonpartisan organization Working Assets. Volunteers were randomly assigned to 
either the experimental group, which received general mass emails, and the control group 
which did not. Election result data were compared to the Working Assets lists. According 
to Nickerson, the data suggested that mobilization by email was not effective. 
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Political scientists have also investigated the impact of grassroots mobilization. 
Bergan et al. studied the critical presidential election of 2004.37 The Bush campaign 
revolutionized voter mobilization through intensive microtargeting efforts of the 
Republican base. Instead of focusing primarily on the persuadable voters, which had been 
standard up to that point, the Bush campaign focused their mobilization drive on 
energizing the base. Bergan et al. utilized data from official campaigns and from the 
National Election Survey. They determined that more than half of the population was 
contacted by either Democrats or Republicans; contact rates increased in battleground 
states. Grassroots mobilization, they argued, are effective because they allow for 
campaigns to make personal contacts with the electorate. However, Bergan et al. said, “if 
campaigns respond strategically to one another, the advantages of grassroots 
campaigning for one party will be largely offset by an opponent responding in kind.”38 
While voter turnout increased significantly between 2000 and 2004, Bergan et al. 
believed the evidence suggested that grassroots mobilization was not the sole cause of 
elevated turnout levels.  
It is a fact that voters participate more regularly in elections with important and 
influential seats such as presidential races. Voters participate in local elections far more 
sparsely. Some political scientists believe that voter mobilization may increase turnout 
levels in low-propensity elections. David Niven studied the impact of door-to-door 
canvassing in a Florida municipal election in 2001.39 Niven determined that, per 
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psychological study, people are more likely to be influenced by persuasion tactics if they 
do not have strong beliefs and opinions. Mobilization will also be ineffective if the 
targeted individual is a habitual nonvoter who is disengaged from politics. It is crucial, 
Niven said, for targets to easily understand the message and for “the targets to think about 
the message, and targets seeing themselves as personally affected by the message affect 
the accessibility of the appeal.”40 Niven conducted field experiments in 2001 in which 
local union members and members of a local church went door-to-door with positive 
messages about the importance of voting in addition to leaving a flier. The data found 
that voter turnout increased among “consistent, intermittent, and seldom voters.”41 
Person-to-person contact was effective in this instance. 
Some studies have shown that person-to-person contact increases voter turnout 
amongst historically low-propensity voters in different minority groups. For example, 
Melissa R. Michelson conducted field experiments in 2001 and 2002 to study the impact 
of nonpartisan door-to-door canvassing of Latinos.42 The data she collected suggest that 
Latinos “can be mobilized to vote by the same sorts of door-to-door, personal efforts that 
are currently in vogue among campaign professionals.”43 Michelson used a mix of 
bilingual and unilingual canvassers who distributed messages that encouraged voting as a 
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civic duty or as a function of ethnic solidarity. The data showed that “to increase Latino 
turnout, more Latinos need to have face-to-face contact with a voter mobilization 
activist.”44 Person-to-person contact, Michelson argued, was influential in persuading 
Latino voters to participate in upcoming elections. Some also argue that Latinos have 
been contacted at lower rates because they are less likely to reside in contentious 
battleground states, which means that their votes are not as critical to winning an 
election.45 
One of the most important themes that shows up throughout many studies of 
mobilization is the importance of asking. Many voters do not participate because they are 
not asked to do so. Steven Schier despairs the development of activation in which “a 
large segment of the public--about half--receive little invitation or inducement to 
participate in our politics.” (Schier, 2000). Verba, Schlozman and Brady uncovered data 
from their massive randomized series of telephone interviews that eligible citizens do not 
participate in politics “because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody 
asked.”46 When individual citizens are targeted for mobilization, they are asked to 
participate and that request encourages them to participate. 
A plethora of scholars has studied voter turnout and voter mobilization. The 
voters who turnout to vote in a given election determine the results. Campaigns, political 
parties and interest groups seek to increase their likelihood of achieving success by 
mobilizing supporters to participate. In the present day, certain voters are targeted by 
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political organizations through a variety of contact methods: door-to-door canvassing, 
email, leaflets and telephone calls, among others. Some scholars believe that this 
transition has been harmful to democracy because not all voters are invited to take part in 
the political process. Others argue that voter mobilization efforts are statistically proven 
to be effective at increasing voter turnout levels. Some suggest that different contact 
methods are more effective at mobilizing eligible citizens than others. Psychology, in 
many instances, is critical in persuading people to overcome the burdensome costs of 
participation in American politics. Mobilization, the scholarship suggests, is tied to voter 
turnout.      
A variety of ways exist in which to contact members of the electorate for the 
purpose of mobilization. The most important elements of mobilization include the ability 
to successfully contact a potential voter through a person-to-person encounter, a phone 
call or the passage of written material such as an email or a leaflet. Mobilization is only 
important if contact with the voter has the power to influence individual voters either to 
persuade them to participate in the electoral process or to vote in a particular way. If the 
contact fails to motivate potential voters, the effort was wasted. Because the influential 
strength of mobilization in the decision making process of individual voters is not 
guaranteed or concrete, whether or not mobilization efforts are worthwhile is a critical 
component of mobilization research in the realm of political science.  
In this project, I will identify the various mobilization tactics employed by 
relevant political parties, campaigns and interest groups in the presidential elections of 
1828 and 2008 and evaluate electoral returns. I will evaluate this data to determine 
24 
 
whether or not mobilization efforts appear to have had an impact upon voter turnout in 
the critical presidential elections of 1828 and 2008.    
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Chapter Three: Analysis of the Presidential Election of 1828 
 The election of 1828 was a rematch between incumbent John Quincy Adams and 
his populist nemesis Andrew Jackson. Factions developed amongst the American 
population backing the military hero or the cold, well-educated member of the elite. 
Supporters of Jackson and of Adams fought for the hearts of the nation through written 
warfare in local newspapers that stretched across the United States. Both parties 
developed sophisticated party systems to rally support for their respective candidates. The 
Jacksonian party led by Martin Van Buren, however, was far more efficient and 
advanced. The new parties sought to influence the outcome of the election by 
encouraging their fellow countrymen to join them at the ballot. These warring factions 
deployed a variety of mobilization practices across the United States. Through the 
implementation of these strategies, Andrew Jackson won the presidency. 
Mobilization practices in 1828 were quite different from the popular methods 
used today. Methods of communication were far less advanced and slow in reaching 
intended individuals and the public as a whole. Ideas were circulated across the nation 
through mail and, most critically, through newspapers. Local papers delivered useful 
information for citizens ranging from ordinary information such as sale of land47 to 
political commentary. Citizens also communicated their political ideas through 
conversation at local party meetings and gatherings. These were the bedrock of 
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dispensation of political knowledge and influence during the 1828 presidential election 
cycle.  
Types of voter mobilization used in the presidential election of 1828 
There are a variety of different types of political mobilization that interested 
parties and entities can employ to energize potential voters. In this section, I will discuss 
the various types of mobilization practices that were utilized by supporters of both 
Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. Afterwards, I will discuss existing data about 
the presidential election and its relation to mobilization practices used. Through these 
means, I will gauge the effects of mobilization practices in this national election cycle.  
 The first type of political mobilization used in the election of 1828 was grassroots 
mobilization. Grassroots mobilization is typified by individual members of a community 
working together for a political cause. Grassroots efforts are often organized from a 
bottom-to-top organizational structure; grassroots strategies focus on local communities 
and neighborhoods. Voters are encouraged to participate at the individual level as 
opposed to en masse. Politics occur at the more intimate neighborhood level as opposed 
to nationally or statewide. Voters are acknowledged and appealed to as individuals. This 
distinction is important to the development of interest and engagement in a particular 
issue or election. When individuals are spoken to at a personal level, they are more likely 
to have an emotional response, whether that be good or bad. Some psychological theories 
suggest that people are more likely to participate in politics if they have an emotional 
reaction.48 Grassroots mobilization seeks to engage potential voters through the 
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emotional connection and reaction inspired by a personalized interaction with a political 
organization.   
Grassroots mobilization was possible due to the organizational structure of the 
developing political parties, most particularly of the Jacksonians. The Andrew Jackson 
and John Quincy Adams factions grew into political parties, which started the two-party 
system in the United States due to the degree of sophistication of the organization and 
their power to influence and unify the public. Based upon the organizational structure of 
Martin Van Buren’s political machine in New York, the Albany Regency,49 the Jackson 
party was designed with a sophisticated organization that extended straight down to the 
neighborhood or ward level. Martin Van Buren began to organize the party in earnest 
following  his reelection to the Senate in 1826.50 His goal was to reestablish the old 
alliance between New York state and Virginia, to link “the ‘plain Republicans of the 
north’ without losing the ‘planters of the South.’” Van Buren was able to accomplish this 
goal through vague policy stances and through an adequate party structure that extended 
through every state of the Union. By the year of 1827, Van Buren’s party existed in every 
major city and town in the United States. The party system was divided into levels 
starting in localities and progressing to the national committee. 
The Jacksonian Democrats were organized into specific tiers. Jacksonians held 
statewide conventions in which the members of a central committee were either elected 
or appointed depending upon the preference of the individual states. Central committees 
were tasked with monitoring the lower county committees and with communicating 
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important information with fellow central committees in other states. County committees 
supervised the progress of city and town committees, which were known as either 
Jackson committees or Hickory Clubs. County committees were “too important in 
shaping mass support to be treated with anything less than deference and respect” by the 
central committees.51 More populated areas were further divided into neighborhood 
wards, similar to the organization of a political machine such as Van Buren’s Albany 
Regency.52 The individual Hickory Clubs and Jackson committees were critical in 
mobilizing voters at the individual level because potential voters were contacted directly 
by friends, neighbors or community leaders who belonged to the party organization. 
Initially, these organizations were filled by wealthier and more educated individuals in 
the community. These individuals would venture into the community “to bring the 
campaign down to the level of the average citizen.”53 Grassroots mobilization would have 
been impossible without local and community level organizations to increase party 
membership and to directly contact potential voters in local communities and 
neighborhoods. Supporters of John Quincy Adams attempted to replicate the 
sophisticated system developed by their rivals with far less success. Similar statewide 
structures were developed and communities hosted various committees for supporters of 
the incumbent president. These committees were not as well organized or as effective at 
contacting ordinary Americans unlike the counterparts of Old Hickory. Supporters of 
Adams “were wealthier and tied more firmly to the commerce of the county seat, while 
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the Jacksonians had closer ties to the rural hinterlands.”54 Because Adams supporters had 
fewer interactions with ordinary Americans, their efforts to mobilize at the grassroots 
level were less successful. Because Jacksonians were already connected to more rural 
individuals, they were better able to spread their message at the local level.    
Potential voters interacted with each other at Hickory Clubs and meetings of 
Adams supporters. Oftentimes, meetings occurred “when men were already gathered for 
militia musters or court meetings especially in the South.”55 Individuals discussed their 
political beliefs at intermittent local meetings. As a collective, the Jackson committees 
gave supporters the means to legitimately express themselves and to further organize for 
the purpose of mobilizing potential voters. Different resolutions were discussed and voted 
upon at Jackson meetings. The proceedings for many of these committees were recorded 
in local partisan newspapers. Take, for example, the resolutions of the Jacksonians of 
Herkimer County, New York in October of 1827: “this convention approve of the 
resolution of the republicans of this state, to oppose the re-election of John Q. Adams to 
the office of President, and most earnestly recommend to their fellow-citizens to give 
their undivided support for that high office to their fellow-citizen General ANDREW 
JACKSON, of Tennessee, a patriot of the revolution, and the hero of the late glorious 
war.”56 The committees also offered their support to local and state politicians of the 
Jacksonian brand who wished to run for elective office in the upcoming days. Party 
solidarity was a key goal of these meetings and, through this unity, party leaders sought 
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to mobilize their fellow party members through participation at the ballot box. The party 
was strongest if it was in power; the only way for a party to be in power in the United 
States is if a plurality of eligible voters favor them on election day.   
In Pennsylvania, a local Jackson committee held a meeting to express its beliefs 
because it was “apprehensive that the state of public feeling might be misconceived, and 
political purposes subserved by their silence...they believe that Mr. Adams, in the 
administration of the General government, has departed from the republican principles 
upon which they think it should be administered.”57 The local communities served 
several different purposes which were beneficial to the Jacksonians. Individual supporters 
were able to discuss politics with others who were interested in such discussion; they 
were able to express and share their enthusiasm for an accepted cause and they were able 
to interact with members of the official party. Through contact with leaders of the party, 
the political parties themselves were able to engage in the political mobilization tactic of 
direct mobilization. General campaign goals were delivered to the attending members of 
the meeting and, later, to the press where additional potential voters could be 
indoctrinated. Indirect mobilization of potential voters followed the local committee 
meetings. Jacksonians who attended a fiery meeting could discuss the proceedings and 
the political discourse that appeared at the meeting with their friends and neighbors, who 
could be influenced by the passion of their comrade. All of these are important 
components of grassroots mobilization strategies. 
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Another critical aspect of voter mobilization in the election of 1828 was the 
organization of electioneering entertainment. Jacksonians in particular hosted a variety of 
different types of events that were designed to heighten the interest and emotional 
investment of potential voters in the election itself. Both campaigns hosted and engaged 
in a variety of different types of entertainment in order to attract the attention of potential 
voters. Individuals are more likely to participate in politics when they are engaged. 
Exciting events hosted by supporters are likely to stick with potential voters and induce 
them to participate. Jacksonians increased investment in politics by hosting and 
producing “barbecues, tree plantings, parades, public rallies, dinners, jokes, cartoons and 
propaganda.”58 These forms of entertainment were exciting and memorable, which 
helped to increase the positive arguments made by supporters in favor of their preferred 
candidate. Some of these events such as hickory pole raisings helped to increase the 
esteem of the already popular military hero. One of Andrew Jackson’s many nicknames 
was Old Hickory “after the tough, fibrous wood well known as the most durable natural 
substance on the frontier.”59  
This symbolism was important in capturing the attention of potential voters and 
inspired confidence in their candidate. A strong symbol was memorable. Jackson’s 
reputation as a military hero increased the legitimacy of his nickname and of his run for 
the presidency. It was important for potential voters to remember Jackson’s skills and 
history. His nickname was encouraged through poems and songs that were circulated in 
newspapers across the United States. One song titled “Hoorah for the Hickory Tree” 
associated positive themes with the valiant hero such as “it’s gude to grateful’ and kind;/ 
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It’s gude to be brave and free;/ It’s gude to support old Hickory’s cause...Hurrah for our 
Liberty Tree;/ Hurrah for the Hickory Tree;/ It’s gude to reward that soldier sa brave.”60 
In this particular piece, Jackson is linked to patriotism. Liberty poles were a common 
practice conducted in the Revolutionary period; hickory pole raisings were essentially the 
same thing. In the 1820s, the infant years of the American experiment were regarded with 
particular reverence. Jacksonians hoped to increase their percentage of the voting 
population by associating Old Hickory with a critical and highly-regarded period of 
history. The campaign themes of strength and virtue underscored the importance of 
participating in the election. Jackson’s military prowess, another popular theme at the 
time, was also highlighted in such songs as “Hunters of Kentucky; Or the Battle of New 
Orleans.”61 This song commemorates the famously successful battle of New Orleans. 
Jackson and his soldiers, the majority of whom were from Kentucky, are celebrated for 
their skill and bravery. Jackson was celebrated because “he was wide awake,/ And was’nt 
scar’d at trifles;/ For well he knew what aim we take,/ With our Kentucky rifles.” This 
song predates Jackson’s run for the presidency but was widely utilized by his campaign 
in order to inspire greater enthusiasm for Old Hickory. Jackson’s military prowess was 
stressed in the form of song and poetry in order to inspire passion in potential voters. 
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Passionate people are more likely to participate in politics. Jacksonians hoped to mobilize 
their fellow citizens to action by attaching patriotic themes to their campaign.  
Get-out-the-vote strategization was also a critical component of the 1828 
presidential election. Partisan newspapers and pamphlets were utilized to encourage 
potential voters to participate. Jacksonians and friends of the Adams administration both 
pleaded with their fellow citizens to participate in the election. Both sides cited fear and 
hatred of the opposition as a battle cry. Should the opposite candidate win the coveted 
seat the country would fall into chaos and ruin, each cried in various ways. The only way 
to prevent such misfortune from befalling the country was through voting. Local party 
organizations were utilized to convene “a committee of twelve for the purpose of using 
all fair and honorable means to bring all who are in favor of Andrew Jackson to the 
polls.”62 The party organization of a political machine was critical in this aspect. 
Community leaders made sure to monitor and encourage potential voters in local 
neighborhoods or wards to get out and vote. In 1828, the election itself took place over 
the course of several weeks across the nation, from October 31 through November 13. 
Different states held their elections at different times during these several weeks. Get-out-
the-vote efforts were critical in mobilizing voters to participate in their states election 
period.  
The Jacksonian party organization encouraged mobilization efforts such as get-
out-the vote. Take, for example, the sophistication of Kentucky organizers who “carryed 
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into full and successful operation last year, a plan or system of Committees, from a 
Principle or Central Committee at Louisville, down to Sub-Committees into every ward 
of the town, and [militia] Captains company in the country.”63 Supporters of the 
Jacksonian cause were divided in a sophisticated manner to contact the greatest number 
of individuals at the local level. Influential people such as militia captains imparted their 
beliefs upon their fellow citizens. A national message delivered from a familiar and 
respected source are more likely to sway the opinion of a potential voter. Through this 
important division of labor, potential voters were mobilized by individuals who held 
positions of respect and command. Jacksonians utilized the community as a vital resource 
for mobilization at the individual level. Jacksonians were able to organize and mobilize at 
the grassroots level. Support for Old Hickory “sought to persuade the voters rather than 
command them.” 64  
The Jacksonians went one step further than their competition by appealing to 
minorities and immigrants. Pennsylvanian Germans, for example, received literature that 
was written in their native tongue of German. Jacksonians “published tracts, handbills, 
and pamphlets in German…[and] sent German-speaking lawyers into heavily populated 
communities to organize rallies and public meetings.”65 By addressing immigrants in 
their native tongue, the party increased its accessibility to a significant number of voters. 
German-speaking voters could independently understand the literature and felt as though 
their voices were welcome in the political system. These immigrants and minorities were 
invited to participate in the political process. The goal was to mobilize fellow citizens to 
participate in the election and to encourage them to vote for their candidate.  
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Jacksonians and friends of the administration also utilized franking to their 
advantage. Members of Congress were able to utilize taxpayer money in order to 
communicate with the public, which is called franking.66 In this way, politicians who 
supported either Jackson or Adams were able to flood constituents with entirely biased 
mail that argued heavily in the favor of their preferred candidate. Critical campaign 
information was distributed to potential voters through these mailings. Supporters of both 
Jackson and Adams were able to disperse mobilizing messages without paying a penny 
because of the frequent abuse of franking. This so-called franking privilege gave both 
campaigns a significant amount of free media, which they used to their advantage. 
Electioneering events were also a critical type of mobilization strategy utilized in 
the election of Andrew Jackson. In the early nineteenth century, it was taboo for a 
candidate to actively run for a political office. If a candidate actively sought office by 
participating in grotesque campaign events and rallies, society frowned upon that 
individual for it was seen as degrading and unbecoming. This was particularly true of the 
presidency for electioneering was “abominable; it is adverse to the spirit of our 
republican institutions, and utterly inconsistent with political liberty.”67 This idea was 
beginning to change. The elite of society still found electioneering appalling but the 
public at large found such activities appealing.  
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Passionate voters wished to see and hear about the ideas of their preferred 
candidate. Because it was distasteful, John Quincy Adams refused to participate in 
electioneering events or to produce electioneering literature. His counterpart, however, 
was different. Andrew Jackson participated in public events that helped to increase his 
popularity amongst the majority of Americans. By further boosting his image and public 
familiarity with his personality, Jackson sought to mobilize the public to support him. 
These events were not technically connected to his campaign but still had the same 
impact. Perhaps most notably, Andrew Jackson participated in a large celebration of the 
victory of the Battle of New Orleans in 1827. Large crowds gathered to witness Old 
Hickory’s arrival and to hear him speak. Newspapers covered the event extensively.68 By 
participating in events that the public was able to read about and to witness for 
themselves, Jackson increased his connection to the people as a whole as well as his 
campaign claim as being a politician for the people.     
Supporters of both Jackson and Adams sought to mobilize members of the public 
by inspiring fear and hatred of the opposition in the media. Both utilized media as a 
mobilizing medium and platform to disperse campaign messages to the public. 
Newspaper, handbills and pamphlets were frequently distributed to potential voters. A 
significant number of newspapers were devoted to one candidate or the other. These 
partisan papers published stories that were incredibly biased in favor of either Jackson or 
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Adams and slandered the reputation of the other. To an Adams newspaper, the election of 
Andrew Jackson was the end of democracy. To a Jackson newspaper, the opposite was 
the case. The morals and reputations of Jackson and Adams were discussed at great 
length and debated. Supporters of the administration condemned Andrew Jackson 
because he “is replete with intemperate bursts of passion, arbitrary measures and gross 
violations of the constitution--all going to show his unfitness for the first office in our 
government.”69  
At the time, Jackson was famous for his military victory at the Battle of New 
Orleans, Adams supporters “deprecate the idea of devotion to men of mere military 
talents, and much more so, to military rulers.”70 Military rulers were something to fear as 
they had the capacity to destroy the democratic experiment through the implementation 
of martial law. Friends of the administration believed that“ the people are wide awake to 
the dangerous precedent of electing a Military Chieftain, one who has universally 
trampled upon and made the civil subservient to the MILITARY power; and who never 
hesitated to violate the Constitution whenever it interposed a barrier to his MILITARY 
SCHEMES and MILITARY AMBITION.”71 Another newspaper expressed 
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“apprehension that the military disposition of the General might, even in the Presidential 
seat, make him unmindful of his civil obligations.”72 Adams supporters inspired fear in 
potential voters with such sweeping statements. Andrew Jackson, the military hero, 
would destroy American values as president.  
John Binns, a particularly fervent Adams supporter, circulated a pamphlet called 
the Coffin Handbill for its depiction of coffins, inaccurately portrayed Andrew Jackson as 
a murderer. The pamphlet stated that “Jackson quarrels with Samuel Jackson, and runs 
him through the body with a sword cane.”73 This handbill was distributed in order to 
mobilize the public against Andrew Jackson. By associating Jackson with horrific 
murders as well as military crimes, the Adams supporters hoped to inspire fear in 
potential voters, which would mobilize them to vote in favor of the incumbent. They also 
associated Jackson with moral degradation by asserting that “in the summer of 1790, 
Gen. Jackson prevailed upon the wife of Lewis Roberts, of Mercer County, Ky, to desert 
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her husband and live with himself in the character of a wife.”74 By encouraging the 
distribution of such lies and mistruths, Adams supporters hoped to mobilize the American 
public by smearing the name of Andrew Jackson. Morally upright citizens would fear the 
presence of morally questionable man in the White House and would vote in favor of 
Adams.  
Supporters of Jackson sought to repudiate unjust claims made against their 
candidate and to muddy the reputation of the incumbent. John Quincy Adams “possesses 
all this kind of cunning and cool calculation.”75 Adams was portrayed as an educated elite 
who disparaged the uneducated majority and was disconnected from the reality of 
ordinary Americans. Jacksonians seized upon the incumbent president’s infamous toast at 
a gathering in Baltimore, in which he discussed “a Philosophical tale of my favorite 
author Voltaire.”76 Adams discussed “the meaning of his toast ‘Ebony and Topaz,’ which 
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he was apprehensive they would not understand, [and] he speaks in the most ironical 
terms.”77 This particular speech spoke to “the far fetched conceit of the President.”78 By 
referencing Voltaire, Adams illustrated his educational superiority over the majority of 
the American public. Adams was well-read, well-educated and, for these reasons, did not 
have the capacity to understand the struggles of average Americans. The “Ebony and 
Topaz” toast underscored Adams’s pride in his own intellect, which he took pleasure in 
parading over the less educated. Adams’s education and family history helped to fuel the 
narrative of stark difference between the two candidates. Jackson did not belong to the 
long-standing American elite. Adams and his supporters also spearheaded painful attacks 
on Old Hickory and his wife alleging that Rachel Jackson was for not yet divorced before 
she lived with Jackson, which especially smeared Mrs. Jackson by implying that she “a 
female whose character whose purity and virtue is at least doubtful.”79 These particular 
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claims underscored the moral deficiencies of John Quincy Adams and his supporters. 
Members of the public were outraged by the “INVIDIOUS SLANDERS which, although 
they are happily repelled by the good sense, the candor, and in DOMESTIC 
INSTANCES, by the DELICACY of the American people, tend to give a broad incorrect 
and disparaging impressions.”80 The public was unhappy with the inclusion of Mrs. 
Jackson’s morals in the realm of politics. This addition, many felt, was an example of 
“falsehood, malice and violence hitherto unknown in political warfare…[and] the people 
cried out shame, shame! And curses loud and deep upon all who committed and 
encouraged this wickedness.”81 The supporters of Adams and the man himself resorted to 
unjust campaign tactics that the people displeased. They spoke to the nature and skills of 
the party and of Adams. Jackson’s skills were derived from the battlefield, which was 
respectable to the common man. Most importantly, Jackson was perceived as “amply 
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qualified to discharge the duties of that exalted station with credit to himself and benefit 
to his country, but that he was likewise the “Man of the People.”82  
By creating a narrative that contrasted the strengths and weaknesses between the 
two candidates, both campaigns hoped to mobilize potential voters in order to vanquish 
their foe. Important themes were incorporated into these narratives that inspired different 
connotations and emotions in the American public. By heralding Jackson as a Man of the 
People and hosting hickory pole raisings, for example, Jacksonians fed the public a 
message of patriotism that contrasted well with the image of Adams as an aloof diplomat. 
The dichotomy of the two men contributed to the strength of the competing narratives 
and encouraged eligible voters to take part in the electoral process as messages were 
dispersed through the media. Grassroot party organizations brought these national 
messages closer to home at Hickory Club meetings and party leaders throughout local 
communities sought to persuade their friends and neighbors. Mobilization was a driving 
force in the election of 1828.   
Data analysis 
Because the presidential election of 1828 occurred so far in the past, plentiful data 
concerning voter turnout do not exist for this particular election. Prevalent data sources 
and means of collecting data such as exit polling did not exist. However, some data do 
exist. These data are critical to understanding the election of Andrew Jackson. I 
attempted to locate anecdotal evidence in primary sources such as newspapers which 
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discussed record turnout rates or some such surprise at the impressive political 
involvement that occurred in this election cycle compared to previous elections. 
Unfortunately, such evidence was unavailable. No such evidence was present in existing 
literature about the election of 1828, Martin Van Buren or Andrew Jackson himself. For 
this reason, I will analyze the sparse existing data concerning voter turnout in the 
presidential election of 1828 and round to the nearest integer. The majority of the data are 
collected from the CQ Press Library; all other sources are cited as they appear.   
In 1828, a variety of different voting regulations limited the pool of eligible voters 
in the United States. Women, for example, were not legally permitted to participate in the 
electoral process and most states also excluded African Americans. However, suffrage 
had expanded a great deal by the election period in 1828. Every state did not require 
citizens to own property in order to vote; in fifteen states white males were not required 
to own property to be eligible to vote, which was a drastic expansion of eligible voters.83 
For this reason, there were 2,074,000 eligible voters in 1828. This was a significant 
increase from the voting-age population in 1824, which capped at 1,362,000. In 1828, 
712,000 more citizens could participate in the electoral process.84   
 Out of the pool of voting-age citizens, 1,148,018 participated in the presidential 
election of 1828. 55.4 percent of the eligible population participated in this particular 
election cycle. Between 1824 and 1828, the number of eligible voters increased from 
1,362,000, an increase of 66 percentage points. However, in 1824 only 365,833 eligible 
voters participated in the presidential election, a mere 27 percent of those who could have 
participated. These data prove that voter turnout increased by a sizable 29 percentage 
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points between 1824 and 1828. The presidential election of 1828 had the highest level of 
voter turnout between 1789 and 1836,85 exceeding 1820, which had the lowest turnout 
level with a measly 10 percent.86 1828 levels beat the 1820 levels by a whopping 45 
percentage points. The average voter turnout rate between 1789 and 1836 was 44 percent. 
Voter turnout levels in 1828 exceeded the average turnout level by 11.5 percentage 
points, which is a significant increase in participation rates. Such a dramatic increase in 
turnout levels is incredibly stark when compared to the relatively low turnout rates 
experienced in the other election years of the given period.    
These data suggest that, in its time, 1828 had the highest voter turnout levels 
witnessed in a presidential election in American history. Eligible voters turned out with 
far greater frequency than they had in any election year before. Evaluation of turnout 
levels at the individual state level underscore this important increase. The average turnout 
rate for individual states was a whopping 52 percent in 1828; in 1824, the average was 
was 28 percent. The difference between average turnout rates in 1824 and 1828 was 23 
percentage points. As is apparent, the difference between the average turnout rates 
between the two years is almost equal to the average statewide turnout rate in 1824.  In 
1828, Rhode Island, the state with the lowest turnout rate, 17 percent of eligible voters 
turned out to vote; in 1824, on the other hand, Virginia, the lowest turnout state, had a 
rate of 12 percent. The difference between the states with the lowest turnout rates is 5 
percentage points. Additionally, in 1828 New Hampshire had the highest turnout rate 
with 75 percent while in the previous presidential election Maryland, the highest turnout, 
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had turnout rates of 54 percent. The difference between these two highest placers is 21 
percentage points. Voter turnout rates, in fact, increased in nearly every state in 1828 
when compared to turnout rates of 1824. Turnout rates increased dramatically and 
significantly between the years of 1824 and 1828.  
Individual states witnessed impressive increases in voter turnout levels between 
the election of 1824 and 1828. Take, for example, the state of Pennsylvania. In the 
election of 1824, Pennsylvania had a voter turnout rate of a mere 20 percent. In 1828, 
Pennsylvania had a turnout rate of 56 percent.87 That is an increase of 37 percentage 
points, which is incredibly significant. Another example is Tennessee, which increased 
from a voter turnout level of 27 percent in 1824 to 50 percent in 1828; the difference 
between these two election years for New Jersey is 23 percentage points. Both of these 
states experienced a significant rise in voter turnout levels. As depicted in Figure 1, 
which is located at the end of this chapter, voter turnout rates increased with the rise of 
the red bars, which represent 1828 as compared to the blue bars, which represent 1824. 
Voter turnout levels increased significantly compared to turnout rates in the previous 
presidential election.    
Data show that Andrew Jackson secured the presidency by accumulating the 
necessary number of electoral and popular votes. Andrew Jackson won 642,553 votes in 
the general election; John Quincy Adams won 500,897.88 That means that 56 percent of 
voters who participated in the election voted for Andrew Jackson while 44 percent of 
voters voted for John Quincy Adams. Jackson received 12 percentage points more than 
his incumbent competitor. The difference between the number of votes that the two 
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candidates received is 141,656. A total of 141,656 more individuals turned out to vote for 
General Andrew Jackson during the 1828 election cycle than did for John Quincy Adams.  
When Jackson ran in 1824, he received 151,271 votes; by 1828, the number of 
votes he received increased by 491,282, which is nearly 500,000. Between the two 
election cycles, Jackson received 25 percentage points more in 1828 than he did in 1824. 
John Quincy Adams received 113,122 votes in the general election in 1824; however, he 
did not win the popular election. Both candidates increased their share of the vote count 
in 1828 as compared to 1824; however, the 1824 election was a four-way battle between 
John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay and William Crawford. In both 
elections, Jackson garnered a greater percentage of the vote than did John Quincy Adams. 
However, he did not collect sufficient numbers in certain states to obtain the necessary 
number of electoral votes in the Electoral College in order to win that particular year. In 
1828, Jackson was able to rally and increase his share of the votes to obtain a seat in the 
White House. 
It is true that there were four presidential candidates in the election of 1824 and 
only two in the election of 1828. For this reason voters, naturally, had to choose between 
the two candidates instead of the four. Because there were fewer candidates, Jackson and 
Adams received higher percentages of the vote. The data show that Jackson was able to 
increase his percentage of the vote by a significant margin during the four year gap 
between presidential election years. Additionally, Jackson was able to secure the 
necessary number of votes in the Electoral College in order to win the election. In 1828, 
Andrew Jackson received 178 electoral votes while his opponent won 83.89 The Twelfth 
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that a candidate must win a majority of the 
electoral votes in an election in order to win; if this does not occur, the House of 
Representatives determines the ultimate winner through a series of votes.90 In 1828, there 
were 261 electoral votes;91 in order to win definitively, a candidate needed to receive at 
least 131 electoral votes. By receiving 178 electoral votes, Jackson cleared the majority 
hurdle by 47 votes. In this way, Jackson was able to secure a sufficient number of 
electoral votes to win the election. Jackson’s success was fueled by his popularity in 
many states.  
It is important to compare data for the presidential election of 1828 with similar 
data from previous years in order to establish the political background and environment 
preceding the election of 1828. By comparing and contrasting the data, the election 
results of 1828 become more stark and unique. By underscoring the political and electoral 
reality of the United States in the early nineteenth century, it is possible to understand 
how revolutionary Andrew Jackson’s election truly was. The election of 1828 truly 
changed the presidential game. After 1828, for example, voter turnout levels changed 
drastically. At the start of the nineteenth century, voter turnout levels hovered in the 
twenties; after 1828, voter turnout levels were never lower than fifty percent.92 The 
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election of 1828 fundamentally altered presidential elections and campaigns; 1828 
marked the rise of voter turnout levels in the nineteenth century.   
Increased participation rates became the norm following the elevated rates of the 
election of 1828. It is possible that these changes occurred because of the increased role 
of voter mobilization efforts that took place in electoral politics in the presidential 
election of 1828. New methods of interacting with potential voters were introduced and 
normalized in the electoral process in 1828; at the same time, voter turnout levels 
increased significantly. The data suggest a possible correlation between the impact of 
voter mobilization efforts upon the voting-age population. The data suggest that voter 
turnout increased significantly in the election of 1828.     
Figure 193
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Chapter Four: Analysis of the Presidential Election of 2008 
 The 2008 presidential election was a match between two senators from Illinois 
and Arizona. It was well-known for a variety of nuances that had not previously typified 
American elections. The internet was an integral component to the development of both 
Barack Obama and John McCain as candidates of their respective political parties.94 Both 
utilized the web to connect with potential voters and to distribute mobilizing messages. 
Political parties, campaigns and interest groups used a variety of different types of voter 
mobilization strategies to encourage supporters to participate in the presidential election. 
Many of these tactics built upon and refined mobilization strategies used in previous 
elections, which sets 2008 apart from other presidential elections. The Barack Obama 
campaign for example, utilized the internet to mobilize impressive levels of individual 
donations to fund his presidential campaign. Additionally, 2008 witnessed an increase in 
voter turnout levels. 
In 2008, more than half of the voting-age population participated in the election 
process leading to a higher than normal level of voter turnout. Additionally, campaigns, 
political parties and interest groups engaged in intense fights to contact and persuade 
targeted potential voters to participate in the presidential election. In this way, these 
groups engaged in a variety of different voter mobilization efforts aimed at increasing 
their share of supporters at the ballot box by election day. In this chapter, I will discuss 
and identify the different types of voter mobilization efforts utilized in the 2008 
presidential election. Then I will analyze data concerning the election results and 
population of 2008. Because of the wide array of rich data sources that exist for the 
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election of 2008, I will supplement these findings from the American National Election 
Studies in order to investigate a correlation between voter mobilization efforts and voter 
turnout rates.  
Types of voter mobilization efforts used in the presidential election of 2008 
Perhaps one of the most important types of mobilization efforts used in the 2008 
presidential election was grassroots mobilization. Drawing on mobilization 
breakthroughs in the 2004 presidential election, Republicans and Democrats focused their 
efforts on targeting certain types of voter such as likely voters instead of focusing on 
undecided voters who were typically the section of the population to whom campaigns 
most sought in the past.95 Republicans engaged in intense grassroots mobilization efforts 
by conducting a 72-hour task force that was based upon the successful program with the 
same name which was used by the George W. Bush campaign in 2004.96 By utilizing this 
adapted tactic, the McCain campaign and the Republican Party were able to contact a 
significant number of potential voters who were likely to belong to the Republican base.  
Both Republicans and Democrats focused on engaging likely voters through 
standard grassroots techniques such as door-to-door canvassing by both volunteers and 
paid staff, contact through telephone banks, and written material such as leaflets. The 
campaigns and party organizations created extensive field operations across the United 
States in order to deploy grassroots mobilization efforts such as those listed above and 
“exploited advances in voter targeting capabilities that provided campaign operatives 
with access to vast amounts of detailed information that they could use to communicate 
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effectively with individual voters.”97 Field operations were utilized to engage in a variety 
of grassroots mobilization tactics such as those listed above. By using databases that 
compiled extensive consumer and voting history patterns, campaigns were able to 
specifically identify and target likely supporters with mobilizing messages. In this way, 
the ideas of both the Howard Dean and George W. Bush 2004 campaigns were refined 
with success. Barack Obama’s campaign in particular was a hybrid system that combined 
a bottom-up design that allowed volunteers to behave spontaneously within the structure 
and control of the campaign’s goals.98 The campaign of his rival, on the other hand, was 
designed in the more typical strictly top-bottom structure wherein volunteers and 
supporters were closely monitored by paid staff who functioned under a strict hierarchy 
of command with the candidate at the top  
Both utilized the internet to connect with and organize potential voters at the 
grassroots level. Both campaigns also had strong presences in states that were vital to 
obtaining the requisite number of electoral votes, often referred to as battleground states. 
These states were “divided into precincts, with a neighborhood team established in each 
precinct and a leader appointed who lived in the neighborhood.”99 By designing an 
intensely local, community-based organization, campaigns engage in grassroots 
mobilization. Grassroots mobilization is critical because it is rooted in local communities 
and neighborhoods. Close ties to communities through the participation of local leaders 
and residents lends a personal edge to political organizing. When a potential voter is 
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contacted by a friend or colleague who is associated with a political organization, the 
contact is more likely to have an impact on the individual. Potential voters, like all 
people, seek to adhere to trends that permeate their social networks. For this reason, “the 
obligations and rewards of friendship, camaraderie, neighborliness, and family ties are 
very powerful. People want to be accepted, valued and liked.”100 Familiar faces 
associated with campaigns tap into the need to conform to social norms. Contact asserts a 
norm of voting and associates a familiar face with the goals of a campaign. These 
psychological components contribute to an individual’s decision to overcome the various 
costs of participation. Because of the relational ties between community members, 
grassroots mobilization is a critical strategy.     
The Obama campaign strengthened their grassroots campaign by utilizing 
technology to orchestrate a complex campaign structure that was open to the participation 
and organizing efforts of volunteers. They also utilized technology to contact individual 
voters through text messaging services and social media networks such as Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube.101 The Obama campaign was fitted with an elite and skilled team 
constructed of technologically savvy individuals including Facebook co-founder Chris 
Hughes. Hughes designed the candidate’s innovative and interactive social network 
website MyBarackObama.com, which was a critical tool because it “enable[d] those who 
did sign up to organize into manageable groups.”102 This particular website was 
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especially useful in the development of grassroots mobilization because it enabled 
motivated volunteers to participate in campaign activities through independent actions.  
MyBarackObama.com, for example, allowed volunteers to call potential voters to 
collect data for the campaign from the comfort of their own homes. Like its mother 
website of Facebook, users were able to “post a photo, a brief description of why they 
support Obama, issues that are important to them, and limited biographical 
information.”103 By attaching local information, the website made it possible for 
supporters to work together at the neighborhood level. The Obama campaign also 
engaged with volunteers so that “those who earned their way into the volunteer hierarchy 
joined a neighborhood team, each with a lead person and at least three deputies given 
specific responsibilities: a phone bank captain, canvass captain, a data coordinator 
responsible for making sure field contacts promptly reached the VAN [Voter Activation 
Network].”104 The Voter Activation Network is a database used by progressive 
organizations such as labor unions, “offering clients an integrated platform of the best 
fundraising, compliance, field organizing, digital, and social networking products.”105 
The VAN was founded by Mark Sullivan in 2001 and was first used in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.106 The VAN provided volunteers and paid staff the technological tools to 
identify, contact and record information about said interactions with potential voters. The 
local component of such innovative tactics was critical to grassroots mobilization. By 
allowing supporters to connect at the local level, the Obama campaign encouraged 
volunteers to spread their political beliefs and enthusiasm to friends and neighbors. Since 
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grassroots organization is typified by the interaction of individuals at the local level, such 
interactive interfaces as MyBarackObama.com were critical to the development of 
grassroots mobilization in the 2008 presidential election.  
Through social networks or socnets such as Facebook or MyBarackObama.com 
the Obama campaign was able to create a successful organization in which volunteers 
were able to “call their own shots, from organizing rallies to recruiting and training a 
cadre of Obama supporters to work their precincts on election day.”107 Volunteers were 
able to act spontaneously but were encouraged to adhere to the guidelines established by 
the campaign itself through incentives “such as help and recognition from campaign 
leadership and staff, to those volunteers that most closely followed the instructions.”108 In 
this way, volunteers were encouraged to both host and attend events such as dinners and 
rallies with friends and neighbors to inspire support and enthusiasm for their preferred 
presidential candidate Barack Obama. The campaign also hosted training events to equip 
volunteer organizers with organizing skills and tools to improve their capacity to engage 
with potential voters.  
David Plouffe, the Obama campaign manager, believed that “it was clear we had 
uniquely motivated and talented volunteers who could give us a leg up, so we tried to 
send the message that they should consider the campaign a movement--their 
movement.”109 The Obama campaign granted volunteers the freedom to act 
independently. By granting volunteers this freedom, the campaign was able to engage in 
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a wide variety of grassroots mobilization efforts such as door-to-door canvassing, 
meetings of local supporters in communities,110 and participation in a national phone 
bank that could be accessed by interested parties from the comfort of their own homes. 
Individual volunteers were able to connect with each other through social media as well 
as to coordinate events in their local communities. This freedom allowed volunteers to 
engage with their friends, peers and neighbors to furnish support for candidate Obama. 
The Obama campaign also hosted training events to teach volunteers skills to ensure that 
they were able to organize effectively.111 
The Obama campaign was further skilled at mobilizing voters through its efforts 
to “personalize the campaign for supporters by connecting to the values and local issues 
that animated their lives.”112 By engaging in grassroots mobilization practices, the Obama 
campaign was able to tap into communities at the local level. The Obama campaign was 
better equipped to interact with potential voters at the personal level in part due to the 
relative degree of freedom that volunteers were granted. The massive scale of the Obama 
operation ensured that the campaign was infused with the cultures of numerous 
communities across the United States. By connecting with individuals at the local level, 
the Obama campaign was able to directly ask potential voters to participate in the 
election, which is a mobilization strategy. Many scholars believe that potential voters can 
be persuaded to become voters simply by being asked to participate.113 Scholars also 
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believe that enthusiastic supporters who choose to participate in mobilization practices 
are more likely to be effective than unwilling volunteers.114  
Additionally, the Obama campaign was able to appeal to different minority 
groups such as Latinos and Asian Americans based upon his post-racial campaign. 
Obama did not base his entire campaign upon his race and, in this way, some viewed his 
campaign as post-racial. As a member of a racial minority group, Barack Obama was 
better perceived as a champion of the post-racial society. He was also able to connect 
with other members of racial groups because his post-racial campaign “allowed 
[minorities] to focus on the parts of his biography to which they could relate.”115 His 
family background, for example, tied him to immigrants. Relatability to the candidate 
acts as a mobilizing agent for voters by making them feel more connected to the election 
due to the shared experiences between the candidate and the individual. When individuals 
feel more connected and, therefore, more emotional about the candidate and the election 
in general, they are more likely to participate. Creating a feeling of closeness between the 
candidate and the potential voters increases the value of the act of voting.  
The John McCain campaign, publicly funded and therefore limited in its capital 
resources, was primarily organized in the typical campaign fashion with control vested in 
the upper echelons who guarded and controlled campaign activities and messages. 
Candidates can select to receive public funds for their campaign, which severely restricts 
the amount of money the campaign can possess in a given period of the election; 
candidates are limited by legislation that prevents supporters from donating unlimited 
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funds between the primary and general elections.116 Privately funding candidates such as 
Obama, who was the first to decline public funds since their introduction to electoral 
politics, are able to amass unlimited funds throughout the course of their campaign.  Like 
his competitor, the McCain campaign created a socnet for supporters to utilize as a 
resource to generate enthusiasm called McCainSpace, a spin on the popular socnet of 
MySpace. Unlike MyBarackObama.com, however, “McCainSpace was nearly impossible 
to navigate and was virtually abandoned.”117 The difficult interface was an obstacle that 
users had difficulty overcoming, which lead to its ultimate demise. Because the McCain 
campaign lacked an adequate socnet for supporters to use for self-expression and 
organizational purposes, the Obama campaign was able to connect with volunteers more 
efficiently. The ability to effectively organize volunteers at the grassroots level impacted 
the degree to which the campaigns were able to mobilize potential voters. In this way, the 
use of the internet in the 2008 presidential elections was closely related to grassroots 
mobilization. 
Technology was also utilized in other important ways in the 2008 presidential 
election. In addition to the use of socnets to communicate with followers and supporters, 
campaigns, political parties and interest groups utilized such technological innovations as 
email and text messaging to interact with potential voters and supporters. The Obama 
campaign in particular integrated technology in their campaign. The Obama campaign 
was able to integrate technological advancements in advertising and communication to 
ensure that campaign messages spread widely. Through the use of the candidate’s 
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website BarackObama.com and MyBarackObama.com, the campaign was able to collect 
significant amounts of contact information such as cell phone numbers and email 
addresses, which were then tapped into to disperse mobilization information. For 
example, “on Election Day, every voter who'd signed up for alerts in battleground states 
got at least three text messages. Supporters on average received five to 20 text messages 
per month, depending on where they lived -- the program was divided by states, regions, 
zip codes and colleges -- and what kind of messages they had opted to receive.”118  
Links to the website were also attached to various campaign advertisements on 
the web. Participants of email lists were frequently contacted with news “as the campaign 
hopes the online supporters will spread the new information to friends, family, and 
colleagues.”119 This particular strategy is an example of indirect mobilization. The 
campaign hoped to indirectly mobilize individuals who were not directly contacted; 
instead, a personal contact would convey the campaign message. The personal 
relationship between the contacted person and those they, in turn, sought to mobilize had 
the potential to influence the decisions of other potential voters. Through the use of such 
extensive programs, the Obama campaign was able to spread mobilization messages to 
significant numbers of voters.  
The Obama tech team also invested in advertising on places like Facebook so that 
“for Obama supporters on Facebook, it was nearly impossible to be on the site at any 
given moment and not see an Obama ad. A critical group known as the ‘analytics team’ 
measured everything that went in and out of the site -- tracking which ad at what time 
drew the most traffic and what kinds of e-mails from the campaign got opened and read 
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most.”120 With the existence of a full-time and skilled technology team, the Obama 
campaign “used peer-to-peer communication to build a juggernaut that did not depend on 
the whims and choices of the media’s collective brain trust.”121 Instead, the Obama 
technology team utilized their skills to identify and target potential voters through 
innovative and competitive experiments with technology such as text messaging and 
advertisement placing.         
Both campaigns, political parties and interest groups also used the media as an 
important platform for distributing campaign messages and to encourage voters to 
participate in the election. Media platforms such as YouTube and Twitter were frequently 
used to convey important messages. Internet-based media platforms were popular for 
political organizations in 2008 because they were forms of free media, meaning money 
did not have to be spent to secure a time spot or location of a given advertisement. 
YouTube was a particularly crucial platform in the 2008 presidential election as the 
video-sharing website was a common interface for the distribution of campaign news and 
new advertisements. Both teams utilized new and innovative video streaming websites 
such as YouTube to communicate with supporters such that an estimated 40 percent of 
registered voters had watched campaign videos online; this coincided with nearly 2.3 
billion viewings of YouTube videos mentioning either Obama or McCain.”122  
Such videos include the Obama Girl and the Black Eyed Peas music video of 
Obama’s New Hampshire speech. The Obama campaign also purchased advertisements 
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in critical areas and time slots such as space in video games and during the Superbowl.123 
By tapping into popular technology and media sources, the Obama campaign was able to 
more effectively communicate with and mobilize young voters who are typically ignored 
in elections. “By June, McCain had posted 208 videos on YouTube that were viewed 3.7 
million times. Obama had more than 1,000 videos that were visited 53.4 million 
times.”124 Such an extensive degree of contact by the campaigns was critical in 
maintaining and generating enthusiasm among supporters. Enthusiastic supporters were 
more likely to contribute donations, volunteer and to vote in the election.    
The typical mediums of media were also utilized to promote or oppose Barack 
Obama and John McCain. Television advertisements, for example, were utilized by both 
campaigns, political parties and interest groups to build arguments either for or against 
each candidate. Through the use of these advertisements, the candidates were cast as 
certain characters. Take, for example, the advertising campaign of John McCain’s 
celebrity feature. “He is the biggest celebrity in the world,” a female voice intoned, as 
images of Britney Spears and Paris Hilton flashed on the screen. “But: is he ready to 
lead?”125 Many of these ads appeared in both English and Spanish, which increased their 
appeal to the growing number of Hispanic voters. Various interest groups conveyed 
mobilizing messages through their advertisements.  
Many advertisements in the 2008 election were negative because “negative ads do 
reach voters and they are sometimes successful in characterizing opponents in the worst 
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possible light and in motivating voters.”126 Take, for example, the National Rifle 
Association Victory Fund spot that premiered in the week prior to election day. This ad 
showcased a frightened mother holding a handgun in her living room as a voiceover said 
“Imagine your child screaming in the middle of the night when a convicted felon breaks 
into your home. As a darkened home is shown on the screen the voiceover added,’ 
“Worse, he comes back a second time. Unbelievably, Barack Obama made you the 
criminal.”127 This particular ad ends with a suit-wearing Obama superimposed upon 
prison bars. By associating Obama with incredibly negative events and actions, the 
Republican Party, interest groups and the McCain campaign itself sought to undermine 
Obama as a candidate. Supporters of Obama, on the other hand, sought to associate John 
McCain with President George W. Bush, who was unpopular at the time. This suggested 
close relationship implied that McCain was a major contributor to the economic 
downturn and that “McCain’s policies hurt, and Obama’s helped, the middle class.”128 
They also suggested that McCain’s long history in Washington politics made him 
disconnected from the daily struggles faced by average Americans.  
Negative advertisements associated candidates with negative events with the goal 
of inspiring negative sentiments in the audience. Negative feelings about a candidate, like 
negative feelings for people in general, reduce the favorability of that candidate. Negative 
advertising is also a mobilizing tactic because it encourages intense emotions. Emotional 
connections increase the perceived benefit that an individual feels about voting. These 
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negative feelings would prompt potential voters to express those sentiments at the ballot 
box. Through these means, advertisements were utilized to mobilize potential voters.  
Positive advertisements were also used to convey important messages with the 
aim of increasing warm feelings for each candidate. Barack Obama, for example, had a 
“thirty-minute prime-time infomercial that cost $1 million and ran on CBS, NBC, 
MSNBC, Fox, BET, TV One, and, Univision, attracting thirty-three million viewers.”129 
Positive advertisements were used to convey positive messages about the candidate’s 
abilities and past experience. The Obama campaign, for example, used the street artist 
Shepard Fairey who had created the famous image of Obama with the word hope in 
addition to Obama with the word vote.130 These positive images of candidate Obama 
were utilized to instill favorable emotions amongst potential voters.     
The presence of field offices is also related to the ability to mobilize potential 
voters at the grassroots level. Campaign and political party staff are organized at field 
offices around the country during elections. From these field offices, staff are able to 
organize outreach and get-out-the-vote efforts in order to persuade potential voters to 
participate. Field offices are the home bases of campaigns and political parties in local 
areas. Volunteers report to paid staff who are stationed in field offices; these staff 
members lead volunteers on grassroots mobilization drives such as door-to-door or 
leafletting canvassing or telephone banks. Because of the relationship between field 
offices and campaign activity, field offices are critical to the development of voter 
mobilization efforts.  
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In 2008, candidate Barack Obama possessed a far greater number of field offices 
than did his competitor. Because Obama had more money at his disposal, he was able to 
support a wide network of connected offices that were similarly fitted with a variety of 
staffers and technology. In early 2008, there were “336 offices for Obama and 101 for 
McCain.”131 By the end of October, the contrast between the number of Obama field 
offices compared to McCain’s was incredibly stark, with Obama clocking in around 700 
and his competitor around 400.132 This significant difference ensured that the Obama 
campaign had the capacity to engage with a greater number of potential voters across the 
country than did his competitor, who was forced to choose where to allocate limited 
resources.         
Campaigns, political parties and interest groups utilized the voter mobilization 
tactic of hosting voter registration drives. Laws require citizens to register before they can 
vote in a given election in the United States. For this reason, citizens must register to vote 
in order to be eligible to vote. Every state has different laws, some of which require 
citizens to register a certain amount of time before an individual can vote while others, 
such as the state of Maine, allow citizens to register on the same day that voting takes 
place. A valuable mobilization tactic is to encourage supporters and potential supporters 
to register to vote. In this way, campaigns, political parties and interest groups hope to 
increase their share of the vote totals. The Obama campaign was particularly interested in 
registering minorities and the young; individuals in these demographic groups often vote 
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at a lower rate than average. Interest groups such as “Democracia USA, which focused on 
Latino voters; Women’s Voices, Women’s Votes, which targeted unmarried women”133 
hosted voter registration drives.   
Perhaps the most critical mobilization tactic utilized in the 2008 presidential 
election was microtargeting. In the past, political parties and campaigns crafted messages 
that would appeal to the electorate as a whole with the goal of increasing enthusiasm and 
support amongst the people in general.134 By 2008, political parties, campaigns, and 
interest groups sought to gain support from the public by engaging with select segments 
of society that are more likely to participate; these likely voters are prodded with 
persuasive actions such as telephone calls, emails and letters to encourage the act of 
voting.135 Potential voters are targeted based upon a variety of different attributes such as 
voting history and political party affiliation that help to identify their political orientation 
and likelihood of voting. Even more information “such as magazine subscription, types of 
cars driven, where individuals shop, how much they earn, commuting patterns, and 
voting histories in local elections”136 are compiled in databases that are used to more 
accurately identify potential supporters and voters.  
Microtargeting was completed by campaigns, political parties and interest groups 
through the use of extensive databases, which tracked important public information such 
as address and voter registration. Such information was critical to determining whether or 
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not an individual was likely to participate in the election cycle and, therefore, whether or 
not it was worthwhile to attempt to mobilize that particular voter. Databases were also 
used to track “any campaign contact--a donation, a volunteer offer, or a contact initiated 
by the camp--is tracked in a master database.”137  
Campaigns utilized databases to identify who to contact. Information in the 
databases made it possible for organizations to identify which residents in a given 
neighborhood were more likely to support their candidate and, therefore, who they should 
contact. Individuals who were likely to be Republicans, for example, were not contacted 
by the Democratic Party because those voters were unlikely to support the Democratic 
candidate. Democrats and other liberal organizations used Harold Ickes’ database service 
called Catalist, which was “a data ‘utility’ for Democratic campaigns and liberal 
causes.”138 Field officers and volunteers also used the Voter Activation Network (VAN) 
to track and identify potential voters.139 Databases ensured that precious resources were 
not wasted on voters who would not support the candidate. This data was used to 
personalize contact such as emails to align with likely areas of interest of potential voters. 
Additionally, in 2008, advertising, discussed earlier in the chapter, was a critical 
component of targeted mobilization efforts. Campaigns, political parties and interest 
groups utilized such advertising ploys as television, radio and internet advertisements to 
convey important messages that they believed would sway certain types of individuals.     
Another important type of voter mobilization utilized in the 2008 presidential 
election were get-out-the-vote efforts. In the rush before the final days of the election, 
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political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups stepped up their mobilization 
games by increasing contact with potential voters with the goal of mobilizing as many 
supporters as possible to vote. This practice is commonly referred to as get-out-the-vote 
or GOTV.  For GOTV, volunteers and staff hit the pavement to knock on doors, fill 
phone banks, and send emails and mass text messages to encourage potential voters to 
become voters. Some of the most popular GOTV methods include door-to-door 
canvassing and telephone conversations wherein “it is the interactive aspects of the 
mobilization effort, combined with the narrative structure, that are key to its 
effectiveness.”140 
The Obama campaign deployed a clever strategy known as the Houdini Project. 
This GOTV method was intricate and effective. The Obama campaign used a “flusher--a 
term for a volunteer who goes out to round up non-voters on Election Day--to know 
exactly who had, and had not, voted in real time.”141 These flushers would go out on 
election day to determine which individuals needed to be contacted and to update 
databases with this information instantly. Databases like VAN were used to track these 
individuals and GOTV volunteers were able to catalogue contact with non- and potential-
voters. By maintaining a constant update of databases like the VAN, the campaign was 
able to accurately track their resources to ensure that contact was not wasted on 
individuals who had already voted.142 During this particular GOTV drive “each voter in a 
precinct was given a four-digit code, and as soon as he or she cast a vote, an Obama 
worker assigned to the polling place would punch in an update by phone to automatically 
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tag the voter’s name in the VAN.”143 The Houdini Project ensured that the campaign 
knew who had voted and who had not voted in real-time, which allowed them to target 
those individuals who had not participated yet. In this way, they were able to streamline 
their mobilizing contacts to those who most needed to be contacted. Mobilizing messages 
were targeted to individual voters who were likely to need the encouragement to get to 
the polls. In this way, Obama supporters were able to magically track voters much like 
the magician Houdini was able to accomplish impossible feats.  
By keeping track of individuals, the Obama campaign was able to determine 
which potential voters needed to be contacted to ensure that as many Obama supporters 
as possible voted by election day. Flushers played an important role in GOTV by 
bringing potential voters to the polls when necessary. Technology was also used to 
engage with potential voters in the GOTV drive. These actions helped to increase the 
number of votes cast in favor of Barack Obama. On MyBarackObama.com’s virtual 
phone banks called the National Call Team, “some 3 million calls were made in the final 
four days of the campaign.”144 Contact with potential voters in the final days of the 
election is a critical component of voter mobilization. 
Volunteers and staff of both campaigns as well as interest groups engaged in 
GOTV activities such as the distribution of fliers and other campaign literature. The 
AFL-CIO was particularly engaged in the distribution of fliers that outlined Obama’s 
positive relationship with labor history and working families and pictured the candidate 
with working people.145 AFL-CIO “staff and volunteers visited 16,000 homes, distributed 
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1.5 million leaflets, and sent out 500,000 mailings.”146 Additionally, the AFL-CIO 
organized an intensive GOTV drive in battleground states  referred to as the “Final Four” 
in the four days leading up to election day in which volunteers and staff contacted 
millions of union employees encouraging them to vote.147 On the conservative side, 
influential interest groups such as the Chamber of Commerce “deployed almost 600 
staffers into the field in the closing days of the 2008 camp, largely to encourage 
Republicans to come to the polls.”148 In this way special interest groups such as labor 
organizations were critical components of the deployment of voter mobilization 
strategies.   
Political parties, campaigns and interest groups utilized voter mobilization 
strategies in the 2008 presidential election. All of these organizations sought to increase 
the share of votes cast for their preferred candidate. Grassroots mobilization tactics were 
deployed by all types of organizations including direct mail, email, door-to-door 
canvassing and telephone contact through telephone banks. The internet was also a 
critical component of grassroots mobilization as supporters connected with each other 
and organized campaign events on social media networks such as Facebook and 
MySpace. Each campaign created websites that in some way mirrored social networking 
websites but Barack Obama’s was better designed and more effective interface. 
Databases were also utilized to identify the proclivities of American citizens who could 
then be targeted with specific messages with the hope of swaying their opinion and 
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motivating them to vote. Advertising was used to develop ideas about the candidates and 
their policy agendas. Both positive and negative advertising was utilized to inspire 
emotion and, in this way, interest in the campaign. Get-out-the-vote drives were also 
important in the final days of the election as volunteers and staff members of political 
organizations increased contact rates with potential voters to motivate them to participate. 
A variety of different types of voter mobilization tactics were used in the 2008 
presidential election.  
Data Analysis 
 Because 2008 occurred so recently, there are a plethora of data about this 
presidential election. In this section, I will analyze data about the presidential election of 
2008. Because more data exist, these data will be far more varied and conclusive than the 
data sets utilized in the previous chapter. To make comparisons more logical, I will 
utilize the same data sources that I used for the election of 1828 and will supplement with 
some of the more advanced resources that were used to record and track data in 2008 as 
compared to 1828. Additionally, I will compare the results from 2008 with previous 
election years to provide greater depth and clarity to the 2008 data.  
In 2008, there were 209,332,000 voting-age individuals in the United States.149 
Out of those 209,332,000 voting-age individuals, 131,300,047 people voted in the 2008 
election. That means that 62.7 percent of the voting-age population participated in the 
2008 presidential election. In the previous presidential election cycle of 2004, there were 
201,780,000 voting-age voters; of these, 122,265,430 participated in the 2008 election.150 
That means that 60.6 percent of the voting-age population turned out to vote in the 2004 
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presidential election. Based on these data, there was an increase of 7,552,000 voting-age 
people in the United States in 2008 when compared to the voting-age population of 2004. 
An additional 9,034,617 Americans voted in the 2008 presidential election compared to 
2004. There was a total increase of 2.1 percentage points in voter turnout between the 
two elections, which is a statistically significant figure. These data suggest that voters 
turned out with greater frequency in the 2008 presidential election than they did in the 
2004 presidential election.   
The presidential election of 2008 had a voter turnout rate of 62.7 percent, which 
the data suggests was the highest turnout rate in a presidential election between 1992 and 
2008.151 The lowest turnout rate in this period was 1996, which had a turnout rate of 51.4 
percent. In 1992, just over half of the population participated in the presidential election. 
The second highest voter turnout year in the period was 2004, which had a turnout rate of 
60.6 percent, a mere difference of 2.1 percentage points. While the turnout rates of 2004 
and 2008 are quite similar, 2008 obviously witnessed higher turnout rates. Among these 
five presidential elections, the average voter turnout rate was 57.38 percent. As 
mentioned, the voter turnout rate of 2008 was 62.7 percent, which means that the voter 
turnout rate was higher than the turnout rate of the average period by 5.42 percentage 
points, which is a statistically significant increase in voter turnout rates. Although the five 
presidential election years between 1992 and 2008 experienced relatively similar voter 
turnout rates, the data suggest that 2008 witnessed an increase in voter turnout levels. The 
difference between the lowest turnout year of 1996, which had a voter turnout rate of 
51.4 percent, and 2008 was a whopping 11.3 percentage points. An increase in voter 
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turnout levels of over ten percentage points is impressive and significant from a statistical 
standpoint. 
If the comparative period is extended to the presidential election of 1964, the data 
suggest that the presidential election of 2008 witnessed the highest presidential turnout 
rates in twelve presidential elections. The average voter turnout rate of this enlarged 
period is 57.03 percent. The 2008 election witnessed voter turnout levels that exceeded 
the average turnout rate in twelve presidential elections by a whopping 5.67 percentage 
points.152 That means that the presidential election inspired a statistically significant 
increase in voter turnout and participation. In 2008 there was the highest voter turnout 
levels witnessed in 44 years, which is a significant rise in voter turnout rates. In this 
period, the lowest voter turnout rate was still 1996, with the lowest turnout rate of 51.4 
percent. That means the 2008 presidential election exceeded the lowest presidential 
election turnout year of the period by 11.3 percentage points, which is highly significant.  
At an individual state level, voter turnout levels were relatively high. The average 
voter turnout rate among individual states was 62.7 percent, according to data collected 
by Gans. In 2008, the state with the lowest turnout rate was Hawaii, which had a turnout 
rate of 49.1 percent while Minnesota, the state with the highest turnout rate, had a turnout 
rate of 75.7 percent.153 The difference between these two rates is 26.6 percentage points, 
which is significant. The stark difference between these turnout rates indicates that voters 
in some states turned out with far greater frequency than did the voters of some other 
states. These figures also indicate that voter turnout was relatively high in every state in 
the 2008 presidential election. Hawaii, the state with the lowest turnout rate, witnessed 
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turnout levels that hovered near fifty percent. If the state with the lowest turnout rate was 
a mere 0.9 percentage points away from fifty, the turnout rates for the nation as a whole 
were largely above fifty percent. Only two states--Hawaii at 49.1 percent and West 
Virginia at 49.9 percent--experienced turnout rates that were under fifty percent. Four 
states had turnout rates that exceeded seventy percent while twelve states had turnout 
rates in the fiftieth percentile. Thirty-two states experienced turnout rates in the sixtieth 
percentile. Over half of the states experienced turnout levels that exceeded fifty percent. 
While turnout rates of fifty percent are far from stellar, they are able to at least somewhat 
represent those who are qualified and therefore eligible to vote.   
In 2008, Barack Obama received 69,456,897 votes in the general election while 
his competitor received 59,934,814 votes.154 Based on these numbers, Obama received 
52.9 percent of the vote in the general election while John McCain received 45.7 percent 
of vote. Based on these numbers, Obama received 7.2 percentage points more than his 
competitor in the election, which is significant. In aggregate numbers, Obama received 
9,522,083 individual votes more than McCain. Due to the size of the American 
population, a small percentage point difference is created by the votes of a large body of 
individual Americans. For this reason, Obama was able to win the election with over 9 
million more votes than the other major contender. This means that over 9 million 
supporters of Barack Obama turned out to vote during the election period than did 
supporters of John McCain. These significant differences created the outcome of the race.  
Like the majority of presidential elections, the election results were determined by 
the voting blocs of various regions of the country. Because of the number of electoral 
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votes that each state is able to contribute to a presidential candidate, some states are more 
critical to gain than are others. Take, for example, the state of California, which has fifty-
five electoral votes as compared to the state of Alaska, which only has three electoral 
votes.155 Fifty-five electoral votes are more likely to contribute to a winning coalition 
than are three electoral votes. A winning coalition is constructed of different regional 
strongholds. In 2008, Barack Obama was able to win the presidency with the support of 
New England, the West Coast, some of the Midwest, a handful of tossup southern states 
such as Florida, the island state that the candidate grew up in, and Colorado and New 
Mexico.156 John McCain, on the other hand, received electoral votes from most southern 
states, most of the Midwest and the states in America’s heartland. However, this coalition 
was not strong enough to win the election. Barack Obama was able to receive support 
from a sufficient number of states that are critical to the Electoral College system such as 
New York and Florida, which both have twenty-nine electoral votes as well as California, 
the state with the largest population and therefore the largest number of electoral votes. 
This winning coalition was critical to Obama’s electoral success.  
In 2008, there were a total of 538 electoral votes in the United States Electoral 
College.157 In order to win the election, a candidate must receive over half of the total 
electoral votes. Two-hundred-sixty-nine electoral votes plus one exceeds the one-half 
requirement that is necessary to win the presidency. To win outright, a candidate much 
receive a minimum of 270 electoral votes in the general election. In 2008, Barack Obama 
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received 365 electoral votes while John McCain received 173 electoral votes. Based on 
these numbers, Obama received 95 more electoral votes than necessary in order to secure 
the presidency. It also means that Obama received 192 more electoral votes than McCain 
did. These differences in the electoral votes caused the election outcome. Because Obama 
was able to secure a winning coalition amongst the various regions of the nation, he was 
able to earn more than a sufficient number of electoral votes to obtain the presidency. 
Additionally, following the election of 2008 a significant number of newspapers 
distributed articles that discussed amazement with record turnout levels. In Tennessee, 
for example, “the number of Hamilton county voters in Tuesday’s presidential election 
was up 8.1 percent from the presidential election four years ago...the number jumped 
nearly 63 percent this year over four years ago to a record 67,989 four years ago.”158 The 
state of Maine also witnessed increased voter turnout levels, which were indicated by “a 
record number of absentee ballots cast before Election Day, long lines at polling places 
across Maine, and the fact that his [the attorney general's] office had to provide additional 
ballots to several towns that were in danger of running out.”159 National news 
organizations similarly distributed analysis of increased voter turnout levels. The Boston 
Globe calculated that “in states won by president-elect Barack Obama, turnout was more 
than five percentage points higher than in states won by [Republican] John McCain, 
according to a Globe analysis of data compiled by a pair of researchers who study voting 
patterns in US elections.”160  
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In 2008, a variety of organizations collected data related to the presidential 
election. Some conducted exiting polls, which took place at polling places on election 
day. Some, such as the American National Election Studies (ANES), conducted surveys 
both before and after the election occurred in order to gauge the degree to which 
individuals were exposed to the presidential election and its related campaigns.161 In the 
ANES 2008 Time Series Study,“2,323 Pre-election and 2,102 Post-election interviews 
were successfully conducted during the field period, including 512 Latino interviews and 
577 interviews by African American respondents.”162 Over-samples were conducted in 
this particular survey to better represent cross-sections of American society. Interviewers 
asked a variety of different questions in order to gauge a respondent’s opinions and 
experiences regarding politics in the United States. Some of the most interesting 
questions are related to the degree of contact that individuals had with campaigns or 
political parties during the election in addition to questions concerning an individual’s 
participation in the election cycle. For example, one question in the ANES Time Series 
Study is “Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a 
sign in your window or in front of your house?”163 These questions seek to gain an 
understanding of how much campaigns interacted with individual voters during the 
election cycle. This survey is critical to understanding the way that campaigns interacted 
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with individual voters and can act as a means to interpret the impact of voter mobilization 
efforts on the voting public.  
The data I am using comes from the ANES cumulative file. I have rounded to the 
nearest integer. Data suggest that 52 percent of respondents who voted in the election and 
participated in the survey tried to influence the vote of others during the campaign while 
78 percent of those who failed to vote also did not try to influence the vote of other 
individuals during the campaign season. Another 84 percent of voters conversed with 
friends and family about politics during the 2008 presidential election while 56 percent of 
those who did not vote were unwilling to engage in such political discourse. These data, 
therefore, suggest that those individuals who abstained from voting did not attempt to 
influence the vote of others during the campaign but that a majority of those who voted 
engaged in indirect mobilization by attempting to influence the vote of others.  
Additionally, some 89 percent of those who voted also watched television 
programs that were related to the election while 27 percent of those who did not vote also 
abstained from viewing television programs related to the election. Of those who voted, 
72 percent read articles related to the election. Of those who voted, 81 percent had access 
to the internet during the election while 19 percent of those who did not vote lacked 
internet access. These data suggest that individuals who voted in the 2008 presidential 
election were more likely to have engaged with mobilizing messages. Political parties, 
candidate campaigns and interest groups in the 2008 presidential election utilized media 
platforms such as television and newspapers to promote and spread mobilizing messages. 
Because a significant percentage of respondents reported having access to these 
platforms, it is possible to infer that many of these individuals received mobilizing 
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messages. For this reason, these data suggest that some potential voters were exposed to 
mobilizing messages distributed by political parties, candidate campaigns and interest 
groups. It is possible that exposure to mobilizing messages persuaded some to vote in the 
2008 presidential election.     
NES respondents were able to identify whether or not they participated in the 
election. Some 49 percent of respondents who voted reported contact with any major 
party during the election of 2008. Respondents who voted further reported contact from 
both the Democratic and Republican parties as 37 and 29 percent respectively. 
Additionally, respondents who voted reported contact from anyone other than parties 
which would include interest groups at 19 percent. While none of these numbers suggest 
that a majority of voters or potential voters were contacted, it does suggest that the major 
political parties engaged in mobilization based upon targeting. Certain individuals were 
targeted by the political organization to receive mobilizing messages, which appear to 
have effectively persuaded some voters to participate.  
Respondents who voted for Democratic candidates attempted to influence others’ 
vote choice at 48 percent in 2008 while 57 percent of Republicans sought to influence 
others. Those who voted for the major parties did not attend political rallies or meetings 
at high rates with a mere 14 percent of Democrats and 6 percent of Republicans reporting 
such participation. However, there is a 8 percentage point difference between those 
individuals who attended rallies, suggesting that a greater percentage of Democratic 
voters engaged in this type of political participation. Democrats also engaged in electoral 
politics by displaying campaign buttons or stickers at a higher level than their Republican 
counterparts, with 27 percent and 16 percent respectively. These data suggest a difference 
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of 11 percentage points between these participatory actions and that Democrats 
participated at higher rates than Republicans. The increased rate of political participation 
by Democratic supporters may have contributed to the elevated rates of Democratic 
supporters at the ballot box.  
Respondents who favored Democrats and Republicans differed in their reported 
levels of media consumption as well. Of respondents who voted for Democrats, 91 
percent watched television programs about the campaign while 89 of Republican 
supporters engaged in this type of activity. Democratic voters read newspapers about the 
campaign at a rate of 71 percent while 73 percent of their Republican counterparts 
reported such activity. Democratic voters also discussed politics with friends and family 
members at higher rates than Republican voters, with 85 percent of Democratic voters 
and 84 percent of Republicans reporting such behavior. These data suggest that a 
significant percentage of both Democratic and Republican supporters were engaged 
during the election season. By taking the time to watch television programs and read 
articles about the election, these voters increased their knowledge and their level of 
exposure to mobilizing messages distributed by political parties, candidate campaigns, 
and interest groups. Democratic voters reported a higher level of exposure to mobilizing 
messages through television programming and article reading, which may have 
contributed to the increased level of Democratic voters in the election. Republican 
supporters reported discussing politics with friends and families at a slightly higher 
percentage than their Democratic counterparts. These data suggest that Democratic and 
Republican supporters were interested in the election.   
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Additionally, 50 percent of Democratic voters reported contact from any major 
party in 2008 while 47 percent of Republican voters reported the same contact. These 
data suggest that Democratic voters were more likely to be contacted by the Democratic 
or Republican party than their Republican counterparts in the presidential election of 
2008. Forty-four percent of Democrats reported contact from the Democratic Party in 
2008 while 30 percent of Republican voters reported contact from the Democratic Party. 
Similarly 37 percent of Republican voters reported contact from the Republican Party 
with 21 percent of Democratic voters reporting contact from the Republican Party. The 
Democratic Party, according to these data, was able to contact a greater number of 
Democratic supporters than Republican supporters. The Republican Party, on the other 
hand, was able to contact a greater number of Republican supporters and fewer 
Democratic voters. The major parties, in short, were able to identify and contact potential 
voters who were likely to support their respective candidates. For this reason, these data 
suggest that the major political parties were able to contact likely supporters with 
mobilizing messages. Mobilizing contact may have persuaded some potential voters to 
participate.  
NES data similarly provide information about mobilization in age-cohorts ranging 
from age 17 to 99. These data suggest that a majority of respondents in all age-cohorts 
watched television programs about the election with 77 percent of 17-24 year-olds as the 
lowest reported rate and 65-74 at the highest with 98 percent. These data suggest that a 
majority of respondents from all age-cohorts were exposed to mobilizing messages in 
television programs. A significant amount of mobilizing messages were transmitted 
through television by political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups in the 
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2008 presidential election. These data suggest that potential voters from all age-cohorts 
were exposed to these mobilizing messages, which may have influenced their decision to 
participate in the election. Additionally, 85 percent of 17-24 year-olds reported having 
access to the internet during the 2008 presidential election. The group with the highest 
internet access rates in the NES report was that of 35-44 year-olds with 87 percent. The 
group with the lowest reported access to internet was the cohort of 75-99 who reported 
internet access at a mere 33 percent. These data suggest that a significant percentage of 
potential voters in several different age-cohorts had the potential to receive mobilizing 
messages through the internet. The internet was an incredibly important platform for the 
dissemination of mobilizing messages in the 2008 election. The internet was critical to 
the Obama campaign’s mobilization effort through innovative usages of Facebook and 
the interactive MyBarackObama.com. These data suggest that mobilizing messages could 
reach potential voters from different age demographics, which were necessary for 
electoral success.    
Racial demographics were also critical in the 2008 presidential election. NES 
respondents had the option of identifying as non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic white and 
other. These data suggest that 91 percent of black, non-Hispanic respondents reported 
watching television programs about the campaign, which was higher than that reported 
by white, non-Hispanics, who reported watching these programs at 84 percent. Another 
89 percent of respondents who identified as other reported this activity. These data 
suggest that well over half of respondents from the three racial/ethnic options was 
exposed to mobilizing messages from political parties, candidate campaigns and interest 
groups through television programming. This exposure may have persuaded some 
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individuals to participate in the election. Additionally, 64 percent of black, non-Hispanics 
reported reading newspapers about the campaign and 69 percent of white, non-Hispanics 
reported the same activity. Respondents who did not belong to either of these racial 
groups reported reading newspaper articles about the campaigns at 64 percent. These data 
indicate that the majority of individuals of the three racial categories had access to some 
of the media platforms that political organizations used to promote mobilization 
messages in the 2008 presidential election. Access to both television and written 
mobilizing messages may have accounted for the increased levels of voter turnout in the 
presidential election of 2008. Mobilizing messages on television and in newspapers may 
have influenced potential voters to become voters.   
Thirty-four percent of white, non-Hispanic respondents, 35 percent of black, non-
Hispanic respondents and 27 percent of respondents who identified as other reported 
contact from the Democratic Party. Similarly, 29 of white, non-Hispanic respondents, 9 
percent of black, non-Hispanic respondents and 15 percent of other respondents reported 
contact from the Republican Party. These data suggest that the Democratic Party 
contacted a greater percentage of voters in all three racial categories. Because Democrats 
were able to contact potential voters of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, they were 
able to convey mobilizing messages to a significant portion of the voting population. 
Mobilizing messages and contacts may have persuaded some potential voters to vote in 
the election. White, non-Hispanic respondents reported discussing politics with family 
and friends at 79 percent; 77 percent of black, non-Hispanic respondents reported the 
same activity; and 75 percent of respondents who did not identify with either of the above 
categories similarly engaged in indirect mobilization. These data suggest that the 
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Democratic Party contacted potential voters at greater rates than did their Republican 
counterparts. Respondents of all three racial categories reported contact from the 
Democratic Party at higher rates than they did for the Republican Party. It is possible to 
infer that a greater number of Democratic supporters turned out to vote in the 2008 
presidential election because a greater number of potential voters from different racial 
backgrounds were contacted with mobilizing messages.  
The NES data provide critical insight into the ways that members of the public 
were exposed to mobilizing messages in the 2008 presidential election. Collectively, they 
suggest that political organizations were in contact with certain segments of the 
population. A significant percentage of respondents reported having access to mobilizing 
messages through direct contact from major political parties and interest groups as well 
as access to television programs and newspaper articles about the campaign. 
Additionally, a significant percentage of respondents from various racial backgrounds, 
age-cohorts and candidate-preferences had access to the internet where a great deal of 
mobilizing content was available. Because these data suggest that a majority of potential 
voters had access to and were exposed to mobilizing messages in the 2008 presidential 
campaign, it is possible to infer a possible correlation between mobilization efforts and 
voter turnout.              
The exit polls conducted of segments of voters as they leave their polling places 
are also indicative of voting trends in election cycles. I am exclusively using the exit poll 
data from CNN because it was superior for the 2008 presidential election.164 The exit 
polls suggest that President Obama was more successful in obtaining support from a 
                                                
164 Cable News Network, “Election Center 2008 Exit Polls.” CNN.com. 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1 (Accessed on 3/31/2017).  
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variety of different demographic groups, including minorities, while his competitor was 
less successful in cultivating support amongst more diverse sections of the population. 
African-Americans voted for Obama at an overwhelming rate of ninety-five percent, 
voting for his competitor with a measly four percentage points. Sixty-seven percent of 
Latinos, another critical demographic, voted for Obama; a mere thirty-one percent voted 
for McCain.165 Obama won sixty-two percent of the vote of Asian voters. These figures 
indicate that Obama received a higher percentage of the vote amongst various minority 
groups when compared to his competitor. These data suggest that Obama was able to win 
the votes of a greater variety of individuals.  
Additionally, Obama received a higher percentage of the vote amongst 
individuals from every educational background: sixty-three percent to thirty-five percent 
amongst voters with no high school education; fifty-two to forty-six percent amongst 
high school graduates; fifty-one percent to forty-seven percent amongst voters with some 
college education; fifty percent to forty-eight percent amongst college graduates; and 
fifty-eight percent to forty percent amongst voters with postgraduate education.166 
However, McCain was able to win a greater percentage of the vote amongst white voters 
with and without a college education. Obama, on the other hand, was able to win the 
support of non-white demographic groups both with and without a college education. 
Obama was able to overcome the barrier of white voter support for McCain by increasing 
his share of the minority vote. 
John McCain received a higher percentage of the votes of white male and female 
workers. Fifty-seven percent of white males voted for McCain, indicating that McCain 
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beat Obama in this demographic by sixteen percentage points, which is a significant 
difference. Fifty-three percent of white women voted for McCain while forty-six percent 
voted for Obama.167 Amongst listed minority groups of both gender, Obama won 
overwhelmingly. Take, for example, black women. In 2008, an astonishing ninety-six 
percent of black women voted for Obama, exceeding the vote obtained by McCain by 
ninety-three percentage points.168 Latino women also voted for Obama at a whopping 
sixty-eight percent; only thirty percent of Latinas voted for McCain. These data indicate 
that McCain was able to obtain the majority of votes from white Americans of both 
genders and of all educational backgrounds. Obama was able to obtain the support of 
minorities across the board.   
Other key demographic groups were critical in the 2008 presidential election. The 
Obama campaign sought to engage with and mobilize the youth vote, for example. The 
age-group of 18-29 voted overwhelmingly for Barack Obama, who received sixty-six 
percent of the vote.169 Obama received a higher percentage of the vote in every age 
bracket except 40-49, where Obama and McCain tied with forty-nine percent each, and 
65 and older, which McCain won with fifty-three percent. Obama received fifty percent 
of the votes of the largest age-group, 50-64, while his competitor received forty-nine 
percent.170 Obama also received sixty-nine percent of the vote of those who had never 
voted before. Obama also received a greater share of the vote of union members and of 
union member families. These significant differences in vote totals are indicative of the 
voting patterns of the American population. These data indicate that Barack Obama 
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received a greater percentage of votes from a variety of different demographics groups 
while McCain was able to obtain a greater proportion of votes of the white population.    
Religion was also an important component of the exit poll data, which indicate 
that McCain obtained the majority of Protestant votes with fifty-four percent. 
Additionally, McCain earned the votes of 73 percent of white evangelicals, compared to 
the twenty-six percent that Obama received. These data suggest that McCain supporters 
were more effective at mobilizing evangelical supporters than Obama was. Obama, on 
the other hand, received a majority of the votes of individuals who identified as either 
Catholic, at fifty-two percent; Jewish, with seventy-eight percent; other, with seventy-
three percent; or non-religious, with seventy-five percent.171 These data indicate that 
Obama was supported by a wider range of voters who came from different religious 
backgrounds while McCain was primarily supported by Christians. Relatedly, McCain 
received a greater percentage of the vote of married individuals with fifty-two percent. 
Obama, on the other hand, received sixty-five percent of the vote of unmarried 
individuals.172  
Expectedly, both candidates received the majority of the vote from voters who 
identified with the candidate’s given party. McCain received ninety percent of the vote of 
voters who identified as Republicans while Obama received eighty-nine percent of the 
vote from individuals who identified as Democrats. In this race, independents were 
critical. In 2008, Obama received fifty-two percent of votes cast by voters who identified 
as independents while McCain received forty-four percent of the vote.173These data 
suggest that Republicans were better able to mobilize independent voters during the 
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election however Obama was able to increase his share of the vote amongst other 
demographic groups. For example, Obama received a greater share of the vote of first-
time voters than his competitor did. Obama received sixty-nine percent of votes of first-
time voters while McCain received thirty percent. These data suggest that Obama 
received the majority of votes of those who identified with the candidate’s party and that 
a significant number of independents decided to support Obama.  
The exit polls also include data about contact that voters received from different 
political organizations. Fifty-one percent of respondents indicated that they had been 
contacted by both the Obama and McCain campaigns. Eighty percent of respondents who 
supported Obama indicated that they had been contacted by the Obama campaign only; 
nineteen percent of McCain supporters indicated that they had been contacted by the 
Obama campaign.174 Eighty-two percent of McCain supporters indicated that they had 
been contacted only by the McCain campaign; seventeen percent of Obama supporters 
reported contact only from the McCain campaign. These data indicate that both the 
Obama and the McCain campaigns contacted a significant number of voters. 
Furthermore, they indicate that a significant number of those contacted by a campaign 
eventually participated in the election. The high contact rates of supporters also suggest 
that campaigns were effectively able to contact individuals who were likely to support the 
candidate. A significant number of individuals who voted for Obama, for example, were 
contacted by the Obama campaign. This means that databases and voter identification 
were effective at determining likely supporters. Because much of campaign contact was 
geared toward mobilization, these data suggest that mobilization contributed to voter 
turnout levels.   
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Fifty-seven percent of respondents indicated that both McCain and Obama 
attacked their competitor unfairly.175 Sixty-two percent of McCain supporters indicated 
that they believed Obama unfairly attacked McCain; thirty-six percent of Obama 
supporters agreed.176 Sixty-five percent of McCain supporters indicated that they felt that 
McCain did not unfairly attack Obama; thirty-two percent of Obama supporters felt 
similarly.177 Sixty-two percent of Obama supporters believed that McCain attacked 
Obama unfairly; thirty-six percent of McCain supporters agreed. These data suggest that 
campaign advertisements, particularly negative ones, had some influence upon the 
thoughts that voters had about the candidates. As intended, the negative advertisements 
inspired emotional responses in the viewing audience, prompting some to participate in 
the presidential election through the act of voting. These data suggest that negative 
advertisements may have had some impact upon voters.  
The 2008 presidential election data suggests that more supporters of Barack 
Obama turned out to vote than did supporters of John McCain. In order to better 
appreciate the turnout levels in 2008, it is appropriate to compare and contrast existing 
and similar result data from previous presidential elections. These similar datasets 
provide context of the electoral environment leading up to the 2008 election and in 
addition to providing superior means to understand voter turnout levels. These data 
suggest that voter turnout in 2008 was higher than in previous election years. A greater 
percentage of the voting-age population turned out to vote in 2008 than they had in 
previous presidential election years. Additionally, turnout levels at the state level 
generally increased in 2008 when compared to previous presidential elections. In order to 
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account for the increase in voter turnout levels, it is important to utilize data from exit 
polls. With these data, it is possible to delve into the psyches and identifying 
characteristics of the voting public.  
Data from exit polls and NES suggest that the campaigns were able to effectively 
identify and contact a significant percentage of citizens who eventually turned out to 
vote, which further suggests that such contact may have influenced some people’s 
decision to vote. Turnout levels amongst demographics such as the youth and African-
Americans who were especially targeted with mobilizing messages by the Obama 
campaign witnessed elevated turnout levels. The fact that these demographics turned out 
at increased rates suggests that mobilizing contact by the campaign influenced some 
people to vote in this election. Additionally, innovative mobilization tactics were 
employed by political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups in the presidential 
election of 2008. By utilizing new technology such as social media, text messaging and 
databases to target potential voters, mobilization became incredibly specialized.  
These data suggest a possible correlation between mobilizing contact and voter 
turnout because potential voters who were contacted were more likely to vote in 2008. 
The data suggests that a significant number of voters were contacted by a campaign and, 
therefore, that those who were contacted by a campaign were more likely to participate. 
For this reason, it is possible to infer a possible correlation between mobilizing contact 
and voter turnout levels. In 2008, innovative mobilization techniques were deployed by 
political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups and at the same time, voter 
turnout increased both in aggregate and in demographic groups that were targeted to 
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receive mobilizing messages. These data suggest a possible correlation between voter 
mobilization efforts and eventual voter turnout.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 Voter mobilization strategies are commonly used in presidential elections. 
Different types of voter mobilization techniques were deployed by campaigns, political 
parties and interest groups in the U.S. presidential elections of 1828 and 2008. Before the 
introduction of advanced technology, the majority of mobilization strategies were rooted 
in direct contact with potential voters and through partisan newspapers. In this way, 
supporters of Andrew Jackson and his rival John Quincy Adams were able to distribute 
persuasive messages with the goal of encouraging supporters to vote in their favor on 
election day. These partisan presses supplied eligible voters with biased images about 
both of the candidates, with some articles depicting Jackson as immoral178 and a 
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murderer179 who would likely destroy the nation if he acquired the coveted White 
House.180 Jacksonians, on the other hand, produced similarly negative ideas about John 
Quincy Adams, who was portrayed to “[possess] all this kind of cunning and cool 
calculation.”181 Supporters of both Jackson and Adams came together to form local 
committees at which individuals could discuss their political views and learn more about 
their favored candidates. With this platform in place, different goals and ideas about the 
candidates were able to spread throughout the United States. Local communities were 
able to develop intricate systems of supporters of each candidate, who were then able to 
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influence the thoughts and opinions of friends and neighbors. Data suggest that voter 
turnout rates were higher in 1828 than they were in previous presidential elections.182  
 Data and information about the election of 1828 are relatively scarce. There is no 
scholarship that explicitly examines the innovative mobilization tactics developed in 
1828. For this reason, my project is integral to the development of such research. Future 
researchers can utilize the topics discussed within these pages to learn more about the 
innovative tactics such as grassroots mobilization that were introduced to American 
electoral politics in this election. The influence of mobilization efforts can be studied 
with greater detail with regard to presidential elections in early American history.   
Technological advances such as socnets and online databases like VAN altered 
the landscape and the mobilizing options that were available to political parties, 
campaigns and interest groups by 2008. Instead of cultivating campaign rhetoric that 
appealed to the general masses as a whole, campaigns strove to specifically target their 
messages to individuals who were likely to support their cause. Databases such as 
Catalist183 gave political parties, campaigns and interest groups the ability to identify 
likely supporters who should be contacted with mobilizing messages. The internet was 
also used in innovative ways to target and reach a significant number of potential voters. 
Social networking websites were used to promote campaign goals and for supporters to 
connect with one another. Obama supporters were able to utilize internet services such as 
Facebook or MyBarackObama.com to organize campaign events. Through such 
grassroots events, volunteers were able to directly and indirectly spread campaign 
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enthusiasm throughout their localities. Video streaming services such as YouTube were 
also popular mediums for contacting potential voters and distributing important campaign 
messages.184 Campaigns also used online tools to track contacts with potential voters and 
to contact them through door-to-door canvassing drives and telephone banks where 
volunteers and paid staff distributed mobilizing messages to identified individuals. 
Traditional forms of grassroots mobilization remained critical to the presidential election 
of 2008 but were supplemented by innovative uses of technology. Traditional media such 
as newspapers and television were also used to convey both positive and negative ideas 
about the candidates. These different images of the candidates were used in the hope of 
inspiring intense emotion in potential voters, which could spur them to the voting box.185 
Voter turnout levels were also higher than in previous election cycles in the 2008 
presidential election with particularly high levels amongst such demographic groups as 
young/new voters and minorities such as African-Americans. Such demographic groups 
were key targets of the Obama campaign’s mobilizing efforts. 
In both 1828 and 2008, political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups 
sought to persuade potential voters to participate in the presidential election. Because 
campaigning requires the usage of valuable resources such as money and time, political 
organization seek to operate with a great deal of efficiency. Many of the voter 
mobilization tactics that are related to personal contact between a political organization 
and an individual potential voter are more effective at persuading eligible citizens to 
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participate. Political organizations seek to distribute mobilizing messages efficiently. 
Political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups utilize tactics that are more 
likely to persuade voters and to influence their opinions about the candidate with the goal 
of contacting as many potential voters as possible, whether that be a specified 
demographic through microtargeting or through broad based appeals in newspapers. The 
types of mobilization strategies in both 1828 and in 2008 were selected because they 
were both efficient and effective at accomplishing the organization’s goals.  
As is apparent, voter mobilization efforts were prevalent in the presidential 
elections of 1828 and 2008. Though the strategies were different due to the available 
types of technology, campaigns, political parties and interest groups in both elections 
sought to increase their share of supporters on election day by mobilizing potential 
voters. Political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups sought to influence the 
election by spreading mobilizing messages to potential voters through media platforms, 
personal contact with supporters and enthusiasm-building events such as rallies. Because 
the evidence suggests that voter mobilization efforts were effective at mobilizing citizens 
to participate in the election, voter mobilization efforts are valuable to political parties, 
candidate campaigns and interest groups. Voter mobilization efforts are related to 
increased voter turnout rates. Because increased voter turnout rates are generally 
perceived as positive by the organizations orchestrating voter mobilization efforts, 
mobilization efforts are an important and valuable component of the electoral process in 
the United States.     
Although data was sparse on 1828, I believe that it is not a coincidence that voter 
turnout levels increased during the same election that innovative campaign tactics that 
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stressed mobilizing potential supporters were first used. A greater number of Jackson 
supporters turned out to vote in the 1828 election cycle than did for John Quincy Adams 
in part because Jackson supporters worked hard to motivate eligible voters to vote in 
favor of their preferred candidate. In other words, Jackson supporters were more 
equipped to mobilize voters than their competitors. By using a sophisticated organization 
of grassroots supporters in the form of Jackson committees, Jackson supporters were able 
to spread campaign messages to friends and neighbors in local communities, which 
influenced voters. Without data to determine how many voters were contacted by either a 
Jackson or Adams Committee member or what newspapers voters were exposed to, proof 
of a correlation between mobilizing contact and voter turnout is not possible for the 
election of 1828. It is possible to conjecture, however, that there may be a correlation 
between mobilizing contact of political parties, campaigns and interest groups and the 
stark rise in voter turnout that occurred in the presidential election of 1828.  
The data similarly suggests a possible correlation between increased voter turnout 
levels in the presidential election of 2008 and the successful implementation of voter 
mobilization strategies. In 2008, political parties, campaigns and interest groups sought to 
increase their share of the vote by persuading supporters to participate in the election. 
The internet was used to identify likely supporters and likely voters. According to NES 
data, a significant number of Americans had access to the internet.186 NES respondents 
also reported engaging with campaign related material by viewing related television 
                                                
186 American National Election Studies, ANES 2008 Time Series Study. Accessed on 3/6/2017.  Retrieved 
from: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/25383?searchSource=find-analyze-
home&sortBy=&q=2008+voter+turnout  
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programs and reading election-related articles in newspapers.187 Resources were streamed 
to direct mobilizing messages such as emails, advertisements and doorstep conversations 
with campaign volunteers at these likely voters. Data suggests that a significant number 
of voters were contacted by either the Obama or the McCain campaign.188 For this 
reason, a possible correlation may exist between voter mobilizing contact and voter 
turnout. Exit poll data suggests that the majority of both Obama and McCain voters were 
contacted by at least one candidate campaign during election season. The high contact 
rate amongst voters is incredibly significant. NES data suggest that only some potential 
voters were contacted by the major party organizations or by any political organization at 
all in the 2008 presidential election.189 Therefore, these data suggest that political parties, 
candidate campaigns and interest groups targeted different voters to receive mobilizing 
messages at the individual level but sought to engage with a wider expanse of voters 
through less specific forms of mobilizing contact such as television advertising. Voters 
were more likely to have experienced campaign contact and, therefore, to have been 
exposed to mobilizing messages. Additionally, demographic groups who were 
particularly targeted by the Obama campaign such as first-time voters and African-
Americans turned out and overwhelmingly voted for Barack Obama.190 NES data suggest 
that respondents from the three racial categories of non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic 
blacks and those who identified as neither of these racial groups were targeted by 
                                                
187 American National Election Studies, ANES 2008 Time Series Study. Accessed on 3/6/2017.  Retrieved 
from: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/25383?searchSource=find-analyze-
home&sortBy=&q=2008+voter+turnout  
188 Cable News Network, “Election Center 2008 Exit Polls.” CNN.com. 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1 (Accessed on 3/31/2017). 
189 American National Election Studies, ANES 2008 Time Series Study. Accessed on 3/6/2017.  Retrieved 
from: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/25383?searchSource=find-analyze-
home&sortBy=&q=2008+voter+turnout  
190 Cable News Network, “Election Center 2008 Exit Polls.” CNN.com. 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1 (Accessed on 3/31/2017).  
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political organizations at different rates.191 Data suggest that the Democratic Party was 
able to successfully contact a greater percentage of potential voters than their Republican 
counterparts. These data suggest that intense efforts to engage and mobilize certain 
segments of society effectively increased the share of the overall vote for either Obama or 
McCain. Increased turnout and support of Barack Obama may be related to increased 
contact of these demographic groups.  
The innovative methods of mobilizing potential voters in addition to increased 
voter turnout rates suggests that voter mobilization efforts were effective in the 
presidential elections of 1828 and 2008. While the data for 1828 is sparse, it suggests a 
possible correlation between mobilizing contact and increased voter turnout. In 1828, 
Martin Van Buren revolutionized electoral politics by creating a sophisticated, 
grassroots-based national party organization in support of Andrew Jackson. By 
contacting potential voters and inspiring enthusiasm for both the candidate and the 
election itself, Jacksonians were able to increase their share of the vote. After this 
election, mobilizing contact by political parties, candidate campaigns and interest groups 
became the norm in presidential elections.  
Similarly, in 2008 the Obama campaign revolutionized electoral politics through 
the use of technology to efficiently and effectively communicate with potential voters and 
supporters. By using the internet to communicate with potential voters, to organize and 
fundraise, the Obama campaign was able to contact significant numbers of voters while 
engaging in a nation-wide, grassroots-based strategy. In both of these election years, data 
suggests that more Jackson and Obama supporters, respectively, turned out to vote. New 
                                                
191 American National Election Studies, ANES 2008 Time Series Study. Accessed on 3/6/2017.  Retrieved 
from: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/25383?searchSource=find-analyze-
home&sortBy=&q=2008+voter+turnout  
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mobilization tactics were utilized by supporters of Jackson and Obama both of whom 
obtained electoral success. For this reason, the evidence suggests that voter mobilization 
efforts were effective.  
In some ways, voter mobilization efforts have remained largely the same between 
the presidential elections of 1828 and 2008. In both elections, potential voters were 
contacted by supporters at the personal level through direct contact from a supporter or 
from a political party, candidate campaign or interest group. Grassroots mobilization was 
important in both elections as it permitted members of a given community to 
communicate with friends and neighbors to convey persuasive messages. Prominent 
members of communities were able to influence friends and neighbors through efforts 
related to grassroots mobilization. Personal contact between supporters and potential 
voters was critical to both elections. Though the means of contact have shifted with the 
introduction of technology, the goal of persuading potential voters through the spread of 
enthusiasm from individual supporters is still crucial to mobilization.  
These mobilization strategies may have transnational impacts as well. The 
election of 2008, for example, was watched very closely by citizens in countries all 
around the world. For many, the relevance of the election was rooted in the race of the 
ultimate winner. Mobilization strategies may have developed in a similar way around the 
world as these various strategies have become popular in the United States. Additionally, 
because many of these strategies were proven to be both effective and efficient through 
exit polling and turnout rates, political organizations in foreign nations may have decided 
to utilize similar techniques.  
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As is apparent, voter mobilization efforts have changed dramatically between the 
presidential elections of 1828 and 2008. Perhaps most importantly, the essential goal of 
mobilization has shifted. In 1828, political parties and interest groups sought to appeal to 
the electorate as a whole; in 2008, political parties, candidate campaigns and interest 
groups sought to influence small, specially-selected portions of the public by engaging 
them with mobilizing messages. Political organizations are more concerned about the 
opinions of those who are passionate about politics because they are more likely to vote 
in the present-day. For this reason, some voters may feel neglected and unimportant, 
which can contribute to higher levels of political apathy. When voters do not feel as 
though their voice or their vote matter, they are less likely to participate. When voters fail 
to participate in politics, their voices are not fairly represented in the government. In this 
way, the new modes of voter mobilization may contribute to inequalities and lack of faith 
in American representative democracy.   
While evidence does support the effectiveness of voter mobilization efforts, other 
questions related to voter mobilization have yet to be answered. Is negative or positive 
advertising more effective at persuading potential voters to participate? Do internet-based 
advertisements influence potential voters with greater frequency than do more traditional 
mediums of advertising such as in newspapers, on television or on the radio? Is contact 
through social media a superior method of distributing campaign messages than 
traditional telephone calls, pamphlets and door-to-door canvassing conversations? Does 
targeting negatively impact or undermine democracy by ignoring certain segments of 
society? Future researchers have a plethora of opportunities to study the relationship 
between voter mobilization efforts and voter turnout by examining: how influential are 
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television advertisements on undecided voters? Does the prevalence of microtargeting in 
electoral politics have negative implications on representative democracy as a whole and, 
if so, what are they? Why do some voters need to be persuaded to participate? It would 
also be possible to incorporate my findings about the elections of 1828 and 2008 in 
relation to the impacts of mobilization efforts on any or all other presidential elections in 
U.S. history. 
In the presidential elections of 1828 and 2008, non-traditional candidates were 
able to obtain the presidency. Andrew Jackson, the first western president who did not 
hail from an elite family, was able to inspire the people with his populist ideology. 
Barack Obama, the first African-American president, was able to inspire minority groups 
and break the tradition of Caucasian dominance in the White House. Political parties, 
candidate campaigns and interest groups played key roles in these respective elections. 
New and innovative mobilization tactics were deployed in order to generate enthusiasm 
and support amongst eligible voters. During these separate periods, voter turnout levels 
increased, suggesting a possible correlation between mobilizing contact and voter 
turnout.        
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